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BOUMEDIENE, AND THE ENEMY—HOW STRATEGIC REALITIES 
CAN CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRE GREATER RIGHTS FOR 
DETAINEES IN THE WARS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Michael Bahar* 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE STRATEGIC AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
To read a detainee decision is to confront a parade of horribles 
destined to occur if courts are allowed to second-guess the battlefield 
decisions of the commander and the President.  “It would be difficult 
to devise more effective fettering of a field commander,” Justice Jack-
son wrote for the Johnson v. Eisentrager majority, “than to allow the 
very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to ac-
count in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from 
the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”1   
More recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice Thomas invoked Jus-
tice Jackson to similarly expound upon the dangers of “judicial inter-
ference” in foreign policy: 
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ 
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are 
not and ought not to be published to the world.  It would be intolerable 
that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps 
nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held se-
cret.  Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive con-
fidences.  But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature 
of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judi-
cial. . . . They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of 
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prophecy.  They are and should be undertaken only by those directly re-
sponsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.2 
In the Court’s latest detainee decision, Boumediene v. Bush, Justice 
Scalia wrote a scathing indictment of judicial interference on the bat-
tlefield, arguing that the majority’s decision “will almost certainly 
cause more Americans to be killed”3 and forebodingly concluding 
that: 
[M]ost tragically, it sets our military commanders the impossible task of 
proving to a civilian court, under whatever standards this Court devises in 
the future, that evidence supports the confinement of each and every en-
emy prisoner. 
  The Nation will live to regret what the Court has done today.  I dis-
sent.4 
While Justices Thomas and Scalia are writing in dissent, what is 
strikingly absent, even in cases which uphold restrictions on presiden-
tial discretion, is any parallel parade of horribles of what is likely to 
occur if commanders and presidents are not answerable to the courts. 
But in counterinsurgencies and the types of conflicts the United 
States will increasingly face in the so-called Fourth Generation,5 ad-
herence to law has become a strategic imperative.  “Most thoughtful 
military and intelligence professionals,” a former Clinton State De-
partment official has noted, “have come to believe that compliance 
with legal norms is a strategic as well as a moral necessity.”6   
Nowhere is this view more prominent than in the U.S. 
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in De-
cember 2006 by General David Petraeus and his Marine counterpart, 
Lieutenant General James Amos.7  The Field Manual officially notes 
the eviscerating strategic effects of “illegitimate actions . . . involving 
 
 2 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago & 
S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)); see also Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 691 n.6 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he President’s abil-
ity to address this ‘new paradigm’ of inflicting death and mayhem would be completely 
frozen by rules developed in the context of conventional warfare.”). 
 3 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4 Id. at 2307. 
 5 See generally THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE:  ON WAR IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2004) (discussing the evolved nature and characteristics of fourth-generation 
warfare). 
 6 Tom Malinowski, Restoring Moral Authority:  Ending Torture, Secret Detention, and the Prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, 618 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148, 148 (2008). 
 7  U.S. ARMY-MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (Univ. of Chicago Press 
2006) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL]. 
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the use of power without authority,” including “unlawful detention, 
torture, and punishment without trial.”8 
The Field Manual not only represents the first time since the end 
of the Vietnam War that the United States has thought systematically 
about, and developed doctrine to cover, the complex, asymmetric 
warfare that will define much of the twenty-first century, but it also 
represents the first major attempt to realize the strategic value of law. 
This conception of law as strategic imperative is a radical depar-
ture from the conceptions of self-styled realists, neoconservatives, and 
others who believe that the changing nature of warfare requires new 
and more permissive rules unregulated by the Constitution and by 
the courts.9  Just prior to the second Gulf War, General Charles 
Horner wrote to the American commander General Tommy Franks:   
In the end, if we are going to lead then we must be considered the mad-
men of the world, capable of any action, willing to risk any thing to 
achieve our national interests. . . . If we are to achieve noble purposes we 
must be prepared to act in the most ignoble manner.10 
But now included in the primary actions the Field Manual deems in-
imical to the success of counterinsurgency operations (“COIN”) are 
those that cut against the impartial application of the law and the use 
of power without authority.  Arbitrariness, inconsistency, and other 
examples of legal double standards “reduce[] credibility and under-
mine[] COIN efforts.”11 
But so far, no recent Supreme Court or appellate court decision 
has weighed the strategic value and function of law in its constitu-
tional calculus.  No law review article, federal opinion, or even fed-
eral court brief has yet to even mention the Field Manual—despite 
myriad “strategic” arguments leveled against the application of, and 
adherence to, law in the global war on terror.  The arguments before 
the Court in Boumediene v. Bush also did not seize the opportunity 
that the official doctrine affords to reveal a theory whereby the pre-
sumption shifts from one in which the Court must justify its oversight 
to one in which the Government must justify the Court’s exclusion. 
 
 8 Id. at para. I-132. 
 9 As Sarah Sewall, Director of the Carr Center on Human Rights at Harvard University, ex-
plains, the Field Manual “challenges much of what is holy about the American way of 
war. . . . Those who fail to see the manual as radical probably don’t understand it, or at 
least understand what it’s up against.”  Sarah Sewall, Introduction to the University of Chicago 
Press Edition:  A Radical Field Manual, in FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, at xxi. 
 10 MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, COBRA II:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 517 (2006). 
 11 Id. at para. I-140. 
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This Article provides just such a theory. 
Ultimately, the legal community needs to understand that the 
Constitution is a strategic document.  It was born of war, grew up in 
war, and can still successfully steer the nation through the wars of the 
twenty-first century.  But all three constitutional branches of govern-
ment must fulfill their roles.  To fully defend the country against all 
enemies foreign and domestic, the courts must satisfy their constitu-
tional responsibility to ensure that expansive battlefield accommoda-
tions to military necessity are available only when necessary. 
And the strategic environment of today has shifted.  Contrary to 
Justices Scalia and Thomas’s protestations and General Horner’s 
madmen-of-the-world-tactic, due process rules are required for a suc-
cessful strategy in the global war on terror.  In fact, one of the most 
influential defense strategists considers American leadership of “new 
rule sets” a central pillar of an effective twenty-first century national 
security strategy.12  If that situation arises, and the political balances 
fail to acknowledge the shift, the courts should unapologetically step 
in. 
None other than Johnson v. Eisentrager,13 traditionally the Govern-
ment’s chief precedent in support of the draconian restrictions of de-
tainee rights, best articulates the strategic and pragmatic nature of 
the Constitution.  It does not stand for the proposition that the Con-
stitution compels exclusion of habeas rights simply because the de-
fendants were aliens held in Germany.  Rather, it restricted these 
rights because the aliens were:  (1) “actual enemies,”14 defined in the 
Constitution’s “primary meaning” as “subject[s] of a foreign state at 
war with the United States”15; and (2) because those aliens lacked suf-
ficient contacts with the United States to make extension of habeas 
pragmatic and strategic.  As Justice Jackson wrote:  “[T]he nonresi-
 
 12 See generally THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON’S NEW MAP:  WAR AND PEACE IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004).  Barnett writes that what was 
scariest about the rule-set misalignment of the 1990s was that the world was trying 
to administer a very complex system using tools designed for another era.  The 
package of new rules sets America forged after WWII was . . . . designed to prevent 
war among great powers, not necessarily to deal with rogue regimes and transna-
tional terrorist networks. 
  Id. at 32–33.  But rather than do away with rules, Barnett proposes new rule sets to cope 
with the new era.  He is not specific on what those rules should be, but he focuses on the 
objective of politically and economically integrating disconnected or periphery nations 
into the core through a common, mutually-agreed upon set of rules, or “global adher-
ence to protocols.”  Id. at 356. 
 13 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 14 Id. at 778. 
 15 Id. at 769 n.2  (emphasis added). 
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dent enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the service of 
the enemy, does not have even this qualified access to our courts, for 
he neither has comparable claims upon our institutions nor could his use of 
them fail to be helpful to the enemy.”16 
In other words, the strategic value of constitutional adherence is a 
two-part test.  This Article will demonstrate:  (a) that only if an indi-
vidual fits into the tightly circumscribed constitutional category of 
“the enemy” is he eligible for indefinite detention without trial as a 
prisoner of war (“POW”); and (b) that he can be deprived of no 
more due process than is pragmatic or strategic.  If the individual is a 
nonstate actor, he is not eligible for imprisonment without trial as a 
prisoner of war because war exists only between states and legal ene-
mies are always state actors.  There are ways to constitutionally target 
nonstate actors,17 but expanding the definition, and treatment, of 
enemies beyond its foundational state nexus subverts core elements 
of the Constitution, including the principle of the separation of pow-
ers and the ban on bills of attainder.  It also proves strategically dele-
terious in the battles of the twenty-first century. 
II.  EISENTRAGER AND “THE ENEMY” 
In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court held that Germans convicted of 
war crimes by a military tribunal in China and imprisoned in Ger-
many could not bring a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legiti-
macy of their confinement.18  While they were civilian employees of 
the German government in China, the petitioners were found guilty 
of aiding the Japanese war effort after the German surrender on May 
8, 1945.19 
The Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision is the most recent case 
to analyze Eisentrager in depth, but while rightfully spending a great 
deal of time on Eisentrager’s functional prong, the majority nonethe-
less skipped over the prerequisite determination.  They never exam-
ined whether Boumediene was an enemy in the first place.  Only over 
properly defined enemies does the Constitution permit a class-based, 
and nearly complete, denial of due process rights without valid sus-
pension of habeas corpus. 
 
 16 Id. at 776 (emphases added). 
 17  See infra Part II.G. 
 18 339 U.S. at 790–91. 
 19 Id. at 765–66. 
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This Part of the Article deals with the precise nature of being an 
“enemy.”  It demonstrates that consistent with practice up to and in-
cluding Eisentrager, an individual must have a connection with a state 
engaged in hostilities against the United States before he can qualify 
for the limited category of persons subject to the most minimal due 
process protections.  As will be discussed in Part II.G, this constitu-
tional principle does not imply that the military, with the President as 
Commander in Chief, cannot target nonstate actors like Al Qaeda in 
the right circumstances, but it means that any captured survivors are 
not prisoners of war, and thus must be afforded greater due process 
protections. 
A.  Defining War 
In the Constitution, there is no enemy without war; and there is 
no war without states.  “From the time when the first modern states 
began to emerge,” the legal and political scholar Philip Bobbitt 
writes, “only states have made war.”20  While Bobbitt correctly asserts 
that, in a practical sense, “[w]e are at war no less than when a conven-
tional state surprised the United States with an attack in 1941,”21 he 
recognizes that for the Constitution, war exists only between sover-
eign nations. 
Children and animals may fight, but they cannot make war.  When crime 
syndicates fight—often lethally—they do not make war and their crimes 
are not war crimes.  Since the Renaissance, brigands, pirates, feudal and 
religious orders, even corporations (like the Dutch East India Company) 
might fight but only states could sanction violence as war.22 
With this history as their backdrop, the Framers derived the con-
stitutional framework for war and the use of force.  They provided 
that, absent invasion, Congress brings the state of war into being,23 
 
 20 PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT:  THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 125 
(2008). 
 21 Id. at 177. 
 22 Id. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  The authorization to use force does not have to take the 
form of a declaration.  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Comment, The Coase Theorem and the 
War Power:  A Response, 41 DUKE L.J. 122, 126 (1991) (arguing that in practice Congress 
does not need to issue a formal declaration in order to “constitutionally manifest its un-
derstanding and approval for a presidential determination to make war”); see also Curtis 
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2062 (2005) (“In sum, in light of the longstanding political branch 
practice of initiating war without a formal declaration of war, consistent judicial approval 
of this practice, changes in international law that render war declarations less relevant, 
and general scholarly consensus, it seems clear that Congress need not issue a formal dec-
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and the President has the power—though not carte blanche 
power24—to prosecute the war and deal with the enemies.  They did 
not explicitly define “war” in the Constitution, but those that greatly 
influenced the Framers’ thinking on the matter—including Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, Emmerich de Vattel, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, and Jean Jacques Burlamaqui25—all considered war a con-
test between states.  Rousseau, for example, wrote that: 
  War is not therefore a relationship between one man and another, 
but a relationship between one state and another.  In war private indi-
viduals are enemies only incidentally:  not as men or even as citizens, but 
as soldiers . . . . each state can have as enemies only other states and not 
men . . . .26 
For the Framers, the magnitude of the threat or attack did not 
render it a war, only the source of it did.  Burlamaqui, the Swiss jurist 
whose works joined the pantheon of international law texts that 
crowded the personal libraries of many of the Framers,27 considered 
the magnitude of the conflict to be a subcategory of war, which only 
existed between sovereign nations: 
A perfect war is that, which entirely interrupts the tranquillity of the state, 
and lays a foundation for all possible acts of hostility.  An imperfect war, 
on the contrary, is that, which does not entirely interrupt the peace, but 
 
laration of war in order to provide its full authorization for the President to prosecute a 
war.”). 
 24 David Barron and Martin Lederman, in their magisterial two-part study of presidential 
war powers in relation to Congress, forcefully argue that original understanding and 
long-standing practice demonstrate that even once a war has been declared, Congress can 
restrict the President’s ability to prosecute the war.  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Led-
erman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 693 (2008) (“[W]e disclaim the traditional assump-
tion that Congress has ceded the field to the President when it comes to war, and proceed 
from a contrary premise:  that even when hostilities are underway, the Commander in 
Chief often operates in a legal environment instinct with legislatively imposed limita-
tions.”); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 946–48 (2008) (discussing the three 
branches of government’s views of presidential war-making powers from 1789 to 2008, 
and concluding that Congress has taken a more active role in the past and that the Presi-
dent has traditionally accepted congressional limitations on his power). 
 25 See Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution:  The Original Understanding, 81 
YALE L.J. 672, 689–97 (1972) (arguing that European and English ideas and philosophers 
shaped eighteenth century American ideas about war). 
 26 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT:  DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF 
INEQUALITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 21–22 (Donald A. Cress ed., trans., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1762). 
 27 See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution:  A Re-
view Essay of John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 909 (1994) (book 
review) (asserting that Burlamaqui’s writing was popular among the educated American 
class). 
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only in certain particulars, the public tranquillity being in other respects 
undisturbed. 
  This last species of war is generally called reprisals, of the nature 
which we shall give here some account.  By reprisals then we mean that 
imperfect kind of war, or those acts of hostility, which sovereigns exercise 
against each other, or, with their consent, their subjects, by seizing the 
persons or effects of the subjects of a foreign commonwealth, that re-
fuseth to do us justice . . . .28 
Accordingly, this distinction between perfect and imperfect war 
found its way into Article I of the U.S. Constitution’s distinction be-
tween the power to “declare War,”29 which denotes a perfect war, and 
the power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”30 which denotes 
imperfect war. 
But war, in whatever form and whatever the magnitude, existed 
exclusively between two nations. 
The early Supreme Court decisions perfectly reflected this under-
standing.  Justice Washington in Bas v. Tingy, for example, stated:  “It 
may, I believe, be safely laid down, that every contention by force be-
tween two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their 
respective governments, is not only war, but public war.”31 
Sixty-three years later, during the Civil War, President Lincoln 
commissioned the first codification of the rules of war, which re-
tained the state-centric construct, and made no mention of magni-
tude.  In Article 20 of Lincoln’s General Orders No. 100, originally 
drafted by Francis Lieber, the President simply defined public war as 
a “state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or govern-
ments.”32 
In the Civil War Prize Cases, “war” was again “well defined” as the 
“state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force.”33  In a public 
war, the belligerent parties are exclusively “independent nations.”34 
 
 28 2 J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 180 (Thomas Nugent 
trans., 5th ed. 1807) (emphasis omitted). 
 29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, cl. 11 (“The Congress Shall have Power . . . To declare 
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water . . . .”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (emphasis added). 
 32 FRANCIS LIEBER, WAR DEP’T, ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE, GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100:  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 
20 (1863), in LEIBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR (Richard Shelly Hartigan ed., 1995). 
 33 The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1863) (emphasis 
added); see also Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 40 (defining “public war” as “every contention by 
force between two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their respective 
governments”). 
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Over 150 years after The Prize Cases, the Supreme Court in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld left the Framers’ state-centric definition of war intact de-
spite the severity of the 9/11 attacks and Al Qaeda’s continuing 
threat.  The Hamdan Court held that the conflict between Al Qaeda 
and the United States in Afghanistan did not fall under the Geneva 
Conventions’ definition of an international armed conflict,35 a term 
that has come to replace “war” in the modern era, precisely because it 
was not a “conflict between nations.”36 
The only exception to this state-on-state construct is not really an 
exception at all, but simply a recognition that entities which possess 
all the characteristics of states (to include holding territory), but 
merely lack formal recognition, are nonetheless states for whom war 
is a possibility.  As the Prize Court explained of the U.S. South during 
the Civil War: 
A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents—
the number, power, and organization of the persons who originate and 
carry it on.  When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile 
manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; 
have cast off their allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced 
hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them 
as belligerents, and the contest a war.  They claim to be in arms to estab-
lish their liberty and independence, in order to become a sovereign 
State, while the sovereign party treats them as insurgents and rebels who 
owe allegiance, and who should be punished with death for their trea-
son.37 
 
 34 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666. 
 35 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–30 (2006) (holding that the Geneva Conven-
tions’ protections do not apply to a conflict with Al Qaeda on the grounds that Al Qaeda 
is not a signatory to the Conventions); see also id. at 641–42 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting that the law of war allows military commissions to try individual offenders). 
 36 Id. at 630. 
 37 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666–67.  In international law, the criteria are slightly 
different, but the end result is the same—to be a lawful belligerent, a fighting force must 
possess sufficient elements of sovereignty to wage “war.”  The Third Geneva Convention, 
for example, allows soldiers of non-state militias or of “other volunteer corps” to qualify 
for prisoner of war status normally reserved to regular soldiers of the High Contracting 
Parties, so long as they fulfill the following conditions: 
(a)  that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b)  that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c)  that of carrying arms openly; and 
(d)  that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 
  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(2), first signed 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 
517 (1897) (“The doctrine of international law on the effect of military occupation of en-
emy's territory upon its former laws is well established.  Though the late war [i.e., the Civil 
War] was not between independent nations, but between different portions of the same 
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B.  But What About “Slave Traders, Pirates, and Indian Tribes”? 
Modern international law theorists have consistently considered 
without demur that war remains a “contention between two or more 
States through their armed forces . . . .”38  Even post-9/11, “[o]ne 
element seems common to all definitions of war,” Yoram Dinstein 
notes in the fourth edition to his leading treatise.  “In all definitions 
it is clearly affirmed that war is a contest between states.”39 
Jack Goldsmith, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office 
of Legal Counsel under President George W. Bush, has been at the 
forefront of the charge to consider hostilities between states and non-
state actors as war; but his view rightfully remains in the minority,40 
and his arguments conflate the constitutional ability of the President 
to use force against nonstate actors with the constitutional conse-
quences of a state of war.41  For example, he and Curtis Bradley write 
that “a number of prior authorizations of force have been directed at 
non-state actors, such as slave traders, pirates, and Indian tribes.”42 
But “Indian tribes” were as much Native American nations as any 
other nation-state.43  In fact, in Article I, the Constitution effectively 
 
nation, yet having taken the proportions of a territorial war, the insurgents having be-
come formidable enough to be recognized as belligerents, the same doctrine must be 
held to apply.”). 
 38 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A TREATISE 202 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 
1952). 
 39 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 5 (4th ed., Cambridge University 
Press 2005) (quoting Clyde Eagleton, The Attempt to Define War, 291 INT’L CONCILIATION 
236, 281 (1933)).  See also the United Nations Charter, to which the United States is a 
signatory:  “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 4 (emphases added).  Accordingly, the United Nations General Assembly’s defini-
tion of aggression is also confined to states:  “Aggression is the use of armed force by a 
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State . . . .”  G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex art. 1 ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 
14, 1974) (emphases added). 
 40 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 349, 350 (2004) (concluding, after scouring the legal literature since 9/11, 
that the claim of a global war on terrorism “is a radical departure from mainstream legal 
analysis”). 
 41 See infra Part II.G. 
 42 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2066. 
 43 And these Indian tribal nations were often in alliance with United States foes such as Eng-
land and France.  See BOBBITT, supra note 20, at 35.  During the French and Indian War, 
the French, along with other European powers, enlisted Native American tribes to fight 
alongside colonial forces.  Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, at 156–57 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 2003) (“Though a wide ocean separates the United 
States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of 
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equates the “Indian tribes” with other sovereign entities, i.e., to “for-
eign Nations” and “the several States.”44 
And war was never declared against slave traders or pirates.  In 
fact, the Framers specifically understood that executive force would 
be employed against piratical, nonstate actors outside of warfare.  After 
all, the constitutional piracy provision is separate from the “declare 
war” clause:  “The Congress shall have Power . . . To define and pun-
ish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 
against the Law of Nations . . . .”45  The Framers knew that a pirate, as 
opposed to a privateer, plied the high seas as a rhetorical hostis hu-
mani generis, an enemy of all mankind.46  Any nation had a right and 
obligation to repress pirates, with their warships, wherever on the seas 
they were found—a rule still in effect today.47 
But once pirates were captured, the Framers knew that rhetoric 
did not a legal status make.  Pirates could not be detained indefinitely 
as prisoners of war, but were to be prosecuted according to domestic 
piracy statutes and criminal procedures.  In a Supreme Court case 
two years after the Constitution was ratified, the Court asked:  
“Whence is it that pirates have not the rights of war?  Is it not because 
they act without authority and commission from their sovereign?”48 
 
confidence or security.  On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing 
settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.  On the other side, and extending to meet 
the British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of 
Spain. . . . The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural 
enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope 
from them.”). 
 44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 45 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1, cl. 10. 
 46 See Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea:  A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval 
Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9–16 (2007) (explaining the history of 
piracy and universal jurisdiction). 
 47 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 105, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (permitting every state to seize a pirate ship or air-
craft, arrest persons and confiscate property onboard, and to decide and impose penal-
ties through its courts).  Though the United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, these 
provisions are considered customary international law.  Moreover, the United States is a 
party to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 19, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 
450 U.N.T.S. 82, which has an identical provision. 
 48 Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 4 (1781); see also LIEBER CODE, supra 
note 32, at art. 82 (“Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, 
or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without 
being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously 
in the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with 
the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of 
the character or appearance of soldiers—such men, or squads of men, are not public 
enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, 
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Congress immediately exercised the constitutional powers the 
Framers provided to punish piracies and other felonies at sea by en-
acting the still-existing 18 U.S.C. § 1651, which provides that:  “Who-
ever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the 
law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United 
States, shall be imprisoned for life.”49 
War could, however, be waged against privateers, i.e., pirates who 
operated on the basis of a commission or letter of marque granted by 
a sovereign.50  This letter transformed the pirate into a state actor, 
and thereby gave him the right to use force against ships with immu-
nity from charges of piracy.51  Thus, when the United States went to 
war against the Barbary pirates, it actually warred against Tripoli and 
its privateers.52 
 
but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.” (emphasis added)); Michael H. 
Passman, Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and International Law, 
33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1 (Winter 2008) (demonstrating that piracy is generally outside the laws 
of war and captured pirates are not POWs). 
 49 Predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); see also id. §§ 1652–61 (enumerating acts 
which qualify as piracy and associated punishments); id. §§ 381–84  (conferring authority 
on the President and the U.S. courts having admiralty jurisdiction for the defense against 
piratical vessels and for their seizure and condemnation).  Other countries have their 
own statutes.  See, e.g., The Penal Code, (1970) Cap. 63 § 69. (Kenya) (outlining actions 
which constitute piracy); Courts of Judicature Act § 22(1)(a)(iv) (1964) (Malaysia), avail-
able at http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/legislation/Court_Of_The_Judicature_Act.shtml 
(granting the High Court jurisdiction over piracy offenses). 
 50 See, e.g., Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden:  How Thinking of Terrorists as 
Pirates Can Help Win the War on Terror, LEGAL AFFS. 32, 34 (July–Aug. 2005) (“Queen Eliza-
beth viewed English pirates as adjuncts to the royal navy, and regularly granted them ‘let-
ters of marque’ (later known as privateering, or piracy, commissions) to harass Spanish 
trade.”). 
 51 Id.  Burgess further explains that while issuing these letters of marque, the queen of Eng-
land, for example, could preserve the vestiges of diplomatic relations, reacting with 
feigned horror to revelations of the pirates’ depredations: 
Witness, for example, the queen’s disingenuous instructions saying that if Raleigh 
“shall at any time or times hereafter robbe or spoile by sea or by lance, or do any 
acte of unjust or unlawful hostilities [he shall] make full restitution, and satisfac-
tion of all such injuries done.”  When Raleigh did what Elizabeth had forbidden—
namely, sack and pillage the ports of then-ally Spain—Elizabeth knighted him. 
  Id. 
 52 President Jefferson, without authority from Congress, sent the American Fleet into the 
Mediterranean, where it engaged in a naval battle with the Tripolitan fleet.  He sent a 
message to Congress on December 8, 1801, in which he said: 
Tripoli, the least considerable of the Barbary States, had come forward with de-
mands unfounded either in right or in compact, and had permitted itself to de-
nounce war on our failure to comply before a given day.  The style of the demand 
admitted but one answer.  I sent a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterra-
nean . . . with orders to protect our commerce against the threatened at-
tack. . . . Our commerce in the Mediterranean was blockaded and that of the At-
lantic in peril. . . . One of the Tripolitan cruisers having fallen in with and engaged 
the small schooner Enterprise . . . was captured, after a heavy slaughter of her 
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As will be discussed further below, the fact that military force can 
be constitutionally used against nonstate actors, such as pirates, out-
side the war context is critical for a successful legal and military strat-
egy in the war on terror.  Force and war are not synonymous, nor is 
the difference mere semantics.  War and the enemy connote a legal 
regime at the constitutional level which, if expanded beyond its 
original understanding, swallows essential pillars of the remaining 
constitutional structure. 
C.  Defining the Enemy 
Underlying Eisentrager is the centuries-old conception that to be 
an enemy, one must be connected to a war, that is, to a state engaged 
in hostilities with the United States.  As Justice Jackson wrote, the de-
fendants before him were “actual enemies, active in the hostile ser-
vice of an enemy power.”53  He defined the “enemy” in its “primary 
meaning” as “the subject of a foreign state at war with the United 
States.”54 
Jackson grounded this conception of the enemy in historical prac-
tice: 
American doctrine as to effect of war upon the status of nationals of bel-
ligerents took permanent shape . . . following our first foreign war.  
Chancellor Kent, after considering the leading authorities of his time, 
declared the law to be that “. . . in war, the subjects of each country were 
enemies to each other, and bound to regard and treat each other as 
such.”55 
Professor George Fletcher accurately noted that Eisentrager represents 
a triumph of the “nineteenth-century conception of warfare,” for be-
ing an enemy required only a residential or legal connection with a 
state engaged in hostilities with the United States.56 
 
men . . . . Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to 
go beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing further 
hostilities, was liberated with its crew.  The Legislature will doubtless consider 
whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place our force on an 
equal footing with that of its adversaries.  I communicate all material information 
on this subject, that in the exercise of this important function confided by the 
Constitution to the Legislature exclusively their judgment may form itself on a 
knowledge and consideration of every circumstance of weight. 
  First Annual Message, 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 
314–15 (Dec. 8, 1801) (first emphasis added). 
 53 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950). 
 54 Id. at 769 n.2. 
 55 Id. at 772 (quoting Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 438, 480 (1819)). 
 56 George P. Fletcher, Black Hole in Guantánamo Bay, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 121, 127 (2004). 
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During the quasi-war with France between 1798 and 1800, the U.S. 
Supreme Court defined war as only existing between states in order 
to derive the meaning of the enemy.57  It held that any time two na-
tions engage in a policy of armed hostilities, individuals within those 
states can become enemies of each other.  In a perfect war, all resi-
dents of the belligerent nations become enemies.  In an imperfect, or 
limited war, only the opposing individuals, authorized or commis-
sioned by the opposing nation, become enemies.  As Justice Paterson 
explained: 
The national armed vessels of France attack and capture the national 
armed vessels of the United States; and the national armed vessels of the 
United States are expressly authorised and directed to attack, subdue, and 
take, the national armed vessels of France, and also to re-capture American 
vessels.  It is therefore a public war between the two nations, qualified, on 
our part, in the manner prescribed by the constitutional organ of our 
country.  In such a state of things, it is scarcely necessary to add, that the 
term “enemy,” applies; it is the appropriate expression, to be limited in its 
signification, import, and use, by the qualified nature and operation of 
the war on our part.  The word enemy proceeds the full length of the 
war, and no farther.58 
If this conception “was ever something of a fiction,” Eisentrager af-
firmed in 1950, “it is one validated by the actualities of modern total 
warfare.”59  For example, during the Civil War, often considered the 
first example of the total warfare experienced in World Wars I and 
II,60 President Lincoln decreed that all individuals within the territory 
of the enemy states are enemies.61  In Articles 20 and 21 of his Gen-
eral Order No. 100, Lincoln incorporated Francis Lieber’s definition 
of war and of the enemy: 
  Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or 
governments.  It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live 
 
 57 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
 58 Id. at 45–46. 
 59 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 772. 
 60 See Russell F. Weigley, American Strategy from Its Beginnings Through the First World War, in 
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY:  FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 408, 443 (Peter 
Paret ed., 1986) (“But the undercurrent of the influence of [General] Sherman and his 
destructive marches also persisted; and while a [General] Grant-style strategy pointed to-
ward Operation Overlord and the great campaign of 1944–1945 across Europe, the mem-
ory of Sherman led toward the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan and eventually 
to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”). 
 61 Lincoln also considered the South sovereign for purposes of warfare.  As the Court in The 
Prize Cases stated:  “The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence 
to the Court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to 
such a measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case.”  The Brig Amy Warwick 
(The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863). 
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in . . . states or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance 
and retrograde together, in peace and in war.62 
  The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of 
the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to 
the hardships of the war.63 
In The Prize Cases, decided during the war over which Lincoln pre-
sided, Justice Nelson similarly articulated this collective conception of 
the enemy in a case involving Union seizure of neutral ships in Con-
federate ports.  He stated that: 
  The legal consequences resulting from a state of war between two 
countries at this day are well understood, and will be found described in 
every approved work on the subject of international law.  The people of 
the two countries become immediately the enemies of each other . . . .64 
In Ex parte Milligan,65 “one of the great landmarks in [the] Court’s 
history,”66 the Court struck down the legality of the court martial of 
Lambdin Milligan, a civilian who had lived in Indiana for twenty 
years, precisely because he lacked the connection to a state involved 
in hostilities with the United States.  The Government alleged that 
Milligan had communicated with the Confederacy, had conspired to 
“seize munitions of war,” and had “join[ed] and aid[ed] . . . a secret 
society known as the Order of American Knights or Sons of Liberty, 
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government . . . of the United 
States.”67  The Court recognized that during wartime Milligan had 
likely committed “an enormous crime”68 at a place “within 
the . . . theatre of military operations . . . constantly threatened to be 
invaded by the enemy.”69 But it found no support for subjecting 
Milligan to military jurisdiction as an enemy combatant because he 
never joined the Confederacy, was never directed by it, and never 
lived in the South.  Although he was a “dangerous enem[y]” of the 
 
 62 LIEBER CODE, supra note 32, at art. 20. 
 63 Id. at art. 21.  Of course, just because all residents within a hostile country were enemies, 
it did not follow that civilian and combatant alike could be targeted in the same fashion.  
See Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443, 455 
(2008) (describing the evolution of the principle of distinction). 
 64 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 687 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 65 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 66 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957). 
 67 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 6. 
 68 Id. at 130. 
 69 Id. at 7. 
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nation in a rhetorical sense, he did not meet the definition of the en-
emy in the legal sense.70 
Later, in a controversy arising out of the Spanish-American War, 
the Supreme Court again remarked that under the rules governing 
the conduct of war between two nations, Cuba, being a part of Spain, 
was enemy territory, and all persons living there, regardless of their 
nationality, were considered enemies of the United States and of all 
its people.71 
The Trading with the Enemy Act,72 passed during the First World 
War, represents legislative concord with the judiciary’s and the execu-
tive’s state nexus conception of the enemy.  It stated that an enemy 
was: 
Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals, of any national-
ity, resident within the territory (including that occupied by the military 
and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war, or 
resident outside the United States and doing business within such terri-
tory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of any na-
tion with which the United States is at war or incorporated within any 
country other than the United States and doing business within such ter-
ritory.73 
During World War II, the state nexus requirement persisted.74  
The Court concluded that even a petitioner claiming American citi-
zenship had been properly classified as an enemy combatant precisely 
because “[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of 
the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction en-
ter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents [combat-
ants] within the meaning of . . . the law of war.”75  In doing so, the 
Court upheld that part of President Roosevelt’s July 2, 1942 Procla-
mation which defined the enemy in terms of its affiliation with a bel-
 
 70 Id. at 130; see also Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) 
(holding that Merryman’s status as a civilian from Maryland precluded the military from 
exercising judicial authority over him). 
 71 Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909); see also Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 
187, 194 (1875) (discussing a claim for cotton arising out of the North’s seizure of South-
ern cotton pursuant to the Abandoned and Captured Properties Act during the Civil 
War, the Court stated that:  “In war, all residents of enemy country are enemies”). 
 72 Pub. L. No. 91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917). 
 73 Id. § 2(a). 
 74 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  See also In re Territo, in which the Ninth Circuit up-
held the indefinite detention of Gaetano Territo, an American citizen who fought for, 
and at the direction of, Italy during World War II, precisely because Territo met the state-
centric definition of an enemy combatant.  156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946). 
 75 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37–38. 
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ligerent state.76  The Court distinguished its determination from 
Milligan’s on the basis of the state nexus, explaining that while the 
petitioners before it were affiliated with the armed forces of an en-
emy nation and thus were enemy belligerents, Milligan was a “non-
belligerent” and so “not subject to the law of war.”77 
While the atrocities of World War II gave birth to modern interna-
tional humanitarian law, further codifying the distinction between 
enemy civilians and enemy combatants,78 the post-9/11 Supreme 
Court still holds true to this state-centric tradition.  In Hamdi, the 
plurality tellingly noted that Milligan “turned in large part on the fact 
that Milligan was not a prisoner of war” and suggested that “[h]ad 
Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate soldiers by 
carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the 
holding of the Court might well have been different.”79  Accordingly, 
 
 76 The Proclamation states: 
         WHEREAS the safety of the United States demands that all enemies who 
have entered upon the territory of the United States as part of an invasion or 
predatory incursion, or who have entered in order to commit sabotage, espionage 
or other hostile or warlike acts, should be promptly tried in accordance with the 
law of war; 
         NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the 
United States of America and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the 
statutes of the United States, do hereby proclaim that all persons who are subjects, 
citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States or who give obedi-
ence to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who during time of war 
enter or attempt to enter the United States or any territory or possession thereof, 
through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or at-
tempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or 
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdic-
tion of military tribunals; [and that such persons shall not be privileged to seek 
any remedy or maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly, or to have any such 
remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United States, 
or of its States, territories, and possessions, except under such regulations as the 
Attorney General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to 
time prescribe.] 
  Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101.  The portion of the text denoted in brackets 
was rendered invalid by Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25, which recognized the capacity of the peti-
tioners to seek a review of the applicability of the Proclamation to their case and to test its 
constitutionality. 
 77 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45. 
 78 Article 48 of the First Protocol to the Geneva Convention states:  “In order to ensure re-
spect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the 
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their opera-
tions only against military objectives.”  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 25 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 79 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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the plurality had no problem with considering Hamdi an enemy 
combatant because he was affiliated with Afghanistan’s Taliban.80 
In al-Marri v. Wright, the initial three-judge panel of the Fourth 
Circuit refused to classify the petitioner as an enemy combatant, no 
matter how dangerous a terrorist he was, because the Government 
could not meet this constitutional state nexus requirement: 
For unlike Hamdi and Padilla, al-Marri is not alleged to have been part of 
a Taliban unit, not alleged to have stood alongside the Taliban or the 
armed forces of any other enemy nation, not alleged to have been on the 
battlefield during the war in Afghanistan, not alleged to have even been 
in Afghanistan during the armed conflict there, and not alleged to have 
engaged in combat with United States forces anywhere in the world.”81 
In other words, for that panel, Al Qaeda, no matter how danger-
ous, was not a state.82 
D.  Al Qaeda May Be an “Unconventional Enemy Force,” but Is It Not an 
“Enemy Force Nonetheless”? 
But if someone, or some nonstate organization, has the capacity to 
wreak great destruction against the United States, why should the le-
gal status not accord with the capacity to destroy?  Indeed, in a 5-4 
decision, the Fourth Circuit issued an en banc opinion which refused 
to endorse the three-judge panel’s state-based conception of the en-
 
 80 But the Hamdi plurality chose not to pronounce a definition of an “enemy combatant,” 
opting instead to confine itself to the facts of the case, namely to “an individual 
who . . . was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ 
in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ there.”  
542 U.S. at 516 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Respondents at 
3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696)).  The plurality also suggested that further elabora-
tion of the category could be left to future cases:  “There is some debate as to the proper 
scope of [the] term [enemy combatant], and the Government has never provided any 
court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.”  Hamdi, 542 U.S. 
at 516.  The opinion only addresses “the narrow question” of “whether the detention of 
citizens falling within that definition [quoted in the text] is authorized.”  Id. 
 81 al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 183 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc sub nom., al-Marri v. 
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 680 (Dec. 5, 2008) 
(No.08-368). 
 82 The Israeli Supreme Court comes at the question from a slightly different angle, but the 
result is essentially the same.  In The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 46 
I.L.M. 375, 382, 388 (Isr. S. Ct. 2007), the majority held that the Israeli conflict with the 
Palestinian terrorists in the disputed areas was of an international character; but it con-
curred with Cassese that there is no “third category.”  Rather, it found that civilians could 
temporarily lose targeting immunity for such time as they directly participate in hostili-
ties—but they remain civilians.  Id. at 391.  Unless an individual is part of the armed 
forces of a state or otherwise fits the definition of a combatant under the Hague and Ge-
neva Conventions, he can only be prosecuted under civilian law, with all the attendant 
rights afforded civilian defendants. 
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emy.83  The panel fell one vote short of rejecting the assertion that the 
August 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, in particular, 
had substantially expanded and redefined the legal category of en-
emy combatant.  As Judge Traxler wrote, “In my view, al Qaeda is 
much more and much worse than a criminal organization.  And while 
it may be an unconventional enemy force in a historical context, it is 
an enemy force nonetheless.”84 
Operating after 9/11, the Bush administration grappled with this 
question and sought to define the enemy more broadly wherever it 
could.  On July 7, 2004, in a memorandum to the Secretary of the 
Navy, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an order (“DOD Or-
der”) establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”).85  
Two weeks later, the Secretary of the Navy, whom the DOD Order 
had designated “to operate and oversee” the CSRT process, issued a 
memorandum (“Navy Memorandum”) that established the standards 
and procedures for those Tribunals.86  Both the DOD Order and the 
Navy Memorandum define an “enemy combatant” as: 
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda 
forces, or associated forced that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners.  This includes any person who has 
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of 
enemy armed forces.87 
The most recent federal case to look at the CSRTs declined to re-
view the constitutionality of this definition, choosing instead to base 
its ruling against the government on the insufficiency of the evi-
dence.88 
But such an unbounded definition is constitutionally incongru-
ous89 and can be strategically deleterious in today’s conflicts.  The le-
 
 83 al-Marri, 534 F.3d 213. 
 84 Id. at 260. 
 85 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf 
[hereinafter DOD Order] (regarding the “Order Establishing Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal”). 
 86 Memorandum from Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, at 2 (July 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf [hereinafter Navy 
Memorandum] (regarding the “Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Procedures for Enemy Combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba”).  
 87 DOD Order, supra note 85, at 1; see also  Navy Memorandum, supra note 86, at Enclosure 
1 § B. 
 88 Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 835–36 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 89 Judge Motz writes that an expansive definition of enemy combatant renders the term “ut-
terly malleable” and “presents serious constitutional concerns.”  al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 243 
(Motz, J., concurring). 
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gal, political and strategic hurdles which thwarted the Bush admini-
stration’s efforts to deal with detainees in the war on terror over the 
past seven years indicate how pragmatically difficult it is to detach the 
enemy from its historical moorings.  As will be discussed in Part II.F, 
releasing “the enemy” from its connection to a state engaged in hos-
tilities is not only unconstitutional in particular, but it more generally 
subverts the original design of the Constitution by overwhelming the 
crucial separation of powers and by instituting an open-ended excep-
tion to the ban on bills of attainder.  It is also constitutionally unnec-
essary.  As will be discussed in Part II.G and Part V, there already exist 
ways to target nonstate actors using executive authority, as well as to 
legislatively (if not judicially) revise the rules of due process to ac-
commodate battlefield realities. 
Ultimately, since the Constitution is a pragmatic document at-
tuned to wartime realities, it should come as no surprise that policies 
which subvert it consequently subvert the war effort itself. 
E.  Restricting the Rights of “the Enemy” 
Before looking at the constitutionally subversive nature of an ex-
pansive enemy definition, it is important to realize first that detach-
ing “the enemy” from its state moorings would enable deprivations of 
individual constitutional rights without any limiting principle.  Once 
someone is properly considered an enemy, like Eisentrager and his 
compatriots, he or she falls into a narrow constitutional category in 
which due process, as well as commercial rights, may legally be re-
stricted.  Importantly, these constitutional limitations are not moti-
vated by spite or vengeance; rather, they are essential tactical ele-
ments in the overall effort to win the nation’s wars. 
In The Rapid, for example, Justice Johnson upheld the seizure of a 
British ship and her cargo during the War of 1812 on the grounds 
that no American had a right to commerce with, and thereby increase 
the material well-being of, the British enemy.90  Even the right to 
transport goods purchased prior to the outbreak of hostilities was 
swept away in wartime.  As “[e]very individual of the one nation must 
acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his own enemy—
because the enemy of his country,”91 the Court concluded that: 
  In the state of war, nation is known to nation only by their armed ex-
terior; each threatening the other with conquest or annihilation.  The 
 
 90 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155 (1814). 
 91  Id. at 161. 
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individuals who compose the belligerent states, exist, as to each other, in 
a state of utter occlusion.  If they meet, it is only in combat.92 
During the Civil War, the Court deprived neutral ships in a Con-
federate port of their property rights because their affiliation with a 
belligerent nation rendered them enemies:  “All persons residing 
within this territory whose property may be used to increase the reve-
nues of the hostile power are, in this contest, liable to be treated as 
enemies, though not foreigners.”93 
Earlier, in two private law cases coming out of the War of 1812, 
the Court affirmed the proposition that alien enemies have no right 
to sue in American courts while the war is in progress.94  At the re-
sumption of the peace, those rights, however, are re-established.  “It is 
also admitted by the best modern authorities, on the law of nations, 
that the plea of alien enemy is only a temporary bar to the recovery of 
private debts, and that the right of action returns with the return of 
peace.”95 
These temporary limitations on commercial intercourse made 
strategic sense.  Thucydides once remarked that “war is not so much 
of arms as of money, by which arms are rendered of service.”96  In The 
Prize Cases, the Court remarked:  “The produce of the soil of the hos-
tile territory, as well as other property engaged in the commerce of 
the hostile power, as the source of its wealth and strength, are always re-
garded as legitimate prize . . . .”97  In the modern era, Paul Kennedy 
similarly underscored the importance of economics to the outcome 
of the great battles of history.98  To allow trade would be to increase 
the abilities of the enemy.99 
However, once the war was over, those practical or strategic neces-
sities would fall away, and the normal channels of commerce and law 
would resume. 
 
 92 Id. at 160–61. 
 93 The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 674 (1863). 
 94 See Jackson v. Decker, 11 Johns. 418 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1814) (barring an alien enemy, residing 
in the enemy’s country, from maintaining an action of ejectment during war); Bell v. 
Chapman, 10 Johns. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (discussing the suspension of an alien en-
emy’s right of action during war). 
 95 Bell, 10 Johns. at 185. 
 96 THUCYDIDES, 1 HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 27 (William Smith trans., 1852). 
 97 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 674 (emphasis added). 
 98 See generally PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS:  ECONOMIC 
CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (Vintage Books 1989) (1987) (de-
scribing the correlation between a Great Power’s economic growth and military empire). 
 99 No doubt appreciating this fact during World War I, the United States passed the Trading 
with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).  See supra note 72 (providing 
definitions under the Trading with the Enemy Act). 
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Eisentrager follows in this nineteenth-century conception of the 
enemy.  This landmark case does not create a class-based “categorical 
rule” that individuals detained abroad have no due process rights,100 
but rather stands for the proposition that enemies, properly defined 
in relation to a state engaged in hostilities against the United States, 
can be deprived of habeas for as long as the deprivation makes prac-
tical and strategic sense: 
[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the 
service of the enemy, does not have even this qualified access to our 
courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon our institutions nor 
could his use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy.101 
Eisentrager instructs that what matters as a threshold concern is 
whether the individual in question is an “enemy alien,” defined in its 
“primary meaning” as the “subject of a foreign state at war with the 
United States,”102 before the executive can deprive him of the great 
privilege of habeas.  Even if international humanitarian law appropri-
ately separates enemy civilian from enemy combatant, Eisentrager is 
still good law on this point because its defendants were not just sub-
jects of a foreign state at war with the United States, but were, in Jus-
tice Jackson’s words, “actual enemies, active in the hostile service of 
an enemy power.”103 
When deciding the appropriate level of due process deprivation 
for the detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, the Supreme Court’s 
Boumediene decision neglected to address the proper “enemy” pre-
requisite and moved prematurely (albeit extensively) to Eisentrager’s 
pragmatic prong.104 
The plurality in Hamdi, however, while declining to explicitly de-
fine “enemy combatant,” explained that the Government cannot in-
voke an exception to the Constitution’s due process entitlements for 
habeas protection if the individual falls outside the narrow category 
of persons to whom the exception applies.  Under the habeas proce-
dure prescribed in Hamdi, if the Government asserts an exception to 
 
100 Fletcher, supra note 56, at 126–27. 
101 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950). 
102 Id. at 769 n.2. 
103 Id. at 778. 
104 Justice Kennedy wrote that, based on Eisentrager, “at least three factors” are relevant in 
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause:  “(1) the citizenship and status of the 
detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was 
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and 
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008).  But he skipped over the status of the 
detainee. 
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the usual criminal process by indefinitely detaining as an “enemy 
combatant” an individual with constitutional rights, it must proffer 
evidence to demonstrate that the individual “qualif[ies]” for this ex-
ceptional treatment.105  In other words, the United States cannot seize 
and indefinitely detain an individual unless the government demon-
strates that he “qualif[ies]” for this extraordinary treatment because 
he first fits within the “legal category” of enemy combatant.106 
F.  The State Nexus Requirement of “the Enemy” Forms a Non-Severable 
Element of the Constitutional Structure 
Attempts to expand the definition of enemy combatant create far 
greater problems than they supposedly solve, because doing so sub-
verts key underpinnings of the constitutional structure. 
George Fletcher has noted a fundamental and historical differ-
ence between an enemy and a criminal, which hints at the dangers of 
expanding the definition of the enemy and severing the state nexus: 
  We should be clear about the differences between the pursuit of jus-
tice and the execution of war.  In matters of justice, we should be focused 
on the individual culprits.  In matters of war, the individual culprits are 
beside the point.  War is waged against a collective, typically a nation-
state.  No one cared about the individual Japanese pilots who returned 
safely from the attack on Pearl Harbor.  They were not criminals but 
rather agents of an enemy power.  They were not personally ‘guilty’ of 
the attack, nor were their commanders, who acted in the name of the 
Japanese nation.107 
Were the category of enemy not narrow, it would incongruously 
blur the constitutional distinction between crime and war by swallow-
ing essential constitutional provisions, including the proscription 
against bills of attainder and the separation of powers structure. 
First, if the president, using his inherent powers, were to use force 
against nonstate actors, such as pirates, without congressional au-
thorization, but treated the targets as “enemies” subject to indefinite 
detention and other restrictions, it could render a dead letter “the 
constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent 
branches,” a design which makes the government accountable and 
secures individual liberty.108  Without the Congress or the courts, the 
 
105 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516, 534 (2004). 
106 Id. at 516, 522 n.1. 
107 George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and Its Pathologies, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 
521 (2007). 
108 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.  Furthermore, as Justice Brandeis explained: 
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President could consider someone or some organization an enemy of 
the state without any limiting principle and without any check.109  For 
example, what is to keep the executive from considering blond-
haired people enemies of the state and treating them as such?  What 
is the constitutional distinction between treating Oklahoma City 
bomber Timothy McVeigh as a criminal with due process rights, and 
Al Qaeda as enemies without due process rights?  Both successfully 
targeted U.S. citizens in horrific terrorist attacks, and neither citizen-
ship nor alienage alone provides a constitutional limiting principle.  
While McVeigh is a citizen and Al Qaeda members may not be, Ex 
parte Quirin demonstrates that being a citizen is no bar to being, and 
being treated as, an enemy.110  On the other side, the Supreme Court 
has consistently held that non-enemy aliens legally in the United 
States are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections as are 
citizens.111  Thus, if the President could unilaterally detain a non-
enemy alien unrestrained by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, so too could he detain an American citizen for whom 
the same Clause equally applies. 
Second, even if the limiting principle is congressional concurrence 
with presidential action,112 as is arguably the case with the Authoriza-
 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, 
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.  The 
purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident 
to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save 
the people from autocracy. 
  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (noting that “[e]ven before the birth of this 
country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny”); cf. Clinton v. 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Liberty is always 
at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers.”); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty . . . .”). 
109 The reciprocal nature of warfare’s breakdown in the legal, economic, and social relations 
between nations—another original check on the tendency for nations to go to war—
would also vanish.  See discussion supra Part II.E. 
110 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942). 
111 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348–50 (2006); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 693 (2001); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); see also United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(observing that “[a]ll would agree . . . that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment protect” an alien lawfully within the United States (emphasis added)). 
112 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2070 (“When, as here, both political branches 
have treated a conflict as a ‘war,’ and that characterization is plausible, there is no basis 
for the courts to second-guess that determination based on some metaphysical concep-
tion of the true meaning of war.”); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 123 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (“When the President acts 
by Congressional authority he has the sum of the powers of the two branches, and can be 
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tion for Use of Military Force against “those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,”113 legislatively 
treating nonstate actors as enemies runs up against the ban on bills of 
attainder,114 a clause which has never been found inapplicable against 
any non-enemy, alien or otherwise.115 
In Mendelsohn v. Meese, for example, the Southern District of New 
York confronted a bill of attainder challenge to the Anti-Terrorism 
Act (“ATA”), which sought to legislatively place certain restrictions on 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (“PLO”).116  The court found 
that “[o]n its face” the ATA is an “accusatory document penalizing 
PLO employees by closing their offices and effectively terminating 
their activities in the United States.”117  The court further explained: 
Having been effectively singled out by Congress, they are left without any 
right of reply or appeal, without right to confront their accusers or sub-
mit evidence in an adversarial proceeding.  They are terrorists by statu-
tory implication but without the slightest proof of their involvement in 
terrorism.  In short, they are subjected to penalties without the panoply 
 
said ‘to personify the federal sovereignty,’ and in foreign affairs, surely, the President 
then commands all the political authority of the United States.” (quoting Steel Seizure, 343 
U.S. at 636 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
113 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); 
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .”).  
Note that the “Bill of Attainder” has not been held to apply to the executive.  In a case in-
volving an air traffic controller whom the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) 
deemed unsuitable for federal employment pursuant to President Ronald Reagan’s direc-
tive indefinitely banning air traffic controllers who went on strike from federal employ-
ment, the Federal Circuit dismissed the controller’s bill of attainder challenge.  Korte v. 
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 797 F.2d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  The court reasoned that the 
Bill of Attainder Clause was intended “as an implementation of the separation of powers, 
a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply—
trial by legislature.”  Id. at 972 (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 
(1965)).  “The clause,” the court added, “is a limitation on the authority of the legislative 
branch.”  Id.  The controller “has cited no authority, and we are aware of none, holding 
that the clause applies to the executive branch.”  Id. 
115 See, e.g., Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1488 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The lan-
guage prohibiting bills of attainder is sweeping, and the Supreme Court’s interpretations 
of it have been expansive.  We believe there is little doubt that the ban applies to bills of 
attainder directed at non-citizens.” (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612–21 
(1960)). 
116 Id. (involving a constitutional challenge to the Anti-Terrorism Act brought by sixty-five 
American citizens and organizations who sought declaratory judgment). 
117 Id. at 1487. 
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of protective shields vouchsafed even to criminal aliens by the federal 
courts in criminal trials.118 
But, while the ATA would have thus presented a “classic Bill of At-
tainder,” the court nonetheless found the ATA permissible.  Why?  
Because the Court equated the PLO to a state, and by extension, its 
members to formal enemies. 
According to its stated reasoning, the court found the ATA a valid 
exercise of Congress’s foreign affairs powers, even though the por-
tions of the PLO structure that would be affected included an official 
observer mission to the United Nations in New York City.  The court 
explained that the Bill of Attainder is a means to maintain the separa-
tion of powers,119 which is not necessary in the field of international 
relations.120  Citing Laurence Tribe’s classic constitutional law treatise, 
the court explained that the “value of a ban on bills of attainder to a 
system of separated powers . . . [reflected] ‘not only the judgment of 
the Framers that the legislative branch of government presented the 
greatest potential threat to liberty, but also the further conviction 
that no branch should be empowered unilaterally to inflict a serious 
hardship on particular individuals or groups.’”121  But because the 
PLO, “as a foreign entity, stands outside the structure of our constitu-
tional system,” there is no reason, according to the court, to protect 
the separation of powers.122 
But the court’s stated reasoning suffers from two major flaws.  
First, the bill of attainder does not only protect separation of powers 
concerns.  After all, the first clause of Professor Tribe’s cited passage 
states that the bill of attainder proscription reflected “the judgment 
of the Framers that the legislative branch of government presented 
the greatest potential threat to liberty.”123  So long as the text of the 
Constitution and the interpretation of the Supreme Court both indi-
cate a broad reach of the bill of attainder clause, there is scant reason 
to believe that non-enemy, nonstate actors who are foreigners slip 
into a broad class of individuals who can, for whatever reason, be sin-
 
118 Id. at 1487–88. 
119 “A basic tenet of our constitutional government is that the three branches of our gov-
ernment should be kept separate and independent of each other without encroachment 
of one upon the other and without the delegation of power from one to the other.  The 
ban on bills of attainder can be viewed as an implementation of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers.”  Id. at 1488. 
120 Id. at 1488–89. 
121 Id. at 1488 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 657 (2d ed. 
1988)). 
122 Id. at 1488–89. 
123 TRIBE, supra note 121, at 657. 
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gled out for punishment regardless of any individual actions and ju-
dicial findings. 
Second, and most important, the judge’s actual reasoning effec-
tively equates the PLO to a state organization, even though the same 
judge had earlier concluded that the PLO had “none of the usual at-
tributes of sovereignty”124: 
  The PLO is the subject of this legislation.  It effectively penalizes in-
dividuals only in prohibiting them from acting in an official capacity as 
representatives of the PLO.  Congress must have the power to do that, 
since the PLO, as a foreign political entity, stands outside our constitutional 
structure.  See [Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 
VA. L. REV. 483, 515–34 (1987)].  Severing diplomatic relations with any 
nation, or declaring war against any nation, works hardships on American 
citizens employed by the foreign power or acting as its official representa-
tives.  But Congress may force an American citizen to choose between the 
full panoply of protections offered by the Constitution and voluntarily 
taking on an official role in the operations of a foreign power.  See U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting U.S. citizens from accepting titles, 
presents or emoluments from foreign governments without the consent of 
Congress); 18 U.S.C. § 959 (1982) (criminalizing enlistment in foreign 
governmental service).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) 
(mandating loss of U.S. citizenship for accepting, serving in or perform-
ing the duties of an office under a foreign government for which an oath of 
allegiance is required); Vance v. Terrazas, [444 U.S. 252, 263 (1980)] 
(statutorily defined voluntary act of expatriation, accompanied by intent 
to relinquish citizenship, sufficient to terminate U.S. citizenship).125 
Because the PLO had an observer mission to the United Nations, 
considered itself to be the representative government of a people, 
and had its own forces, the court effectively equated it to a nation, 
and therefore upheld its treatment as an enemy. 
Mendelsohn thus stands only for the proposition that the bill of at-
tainder clause does not apply to enemies, i.e. individuals and organi-
zations associated with a state or its functional equivalent.  Without 
this functional state nexus, however, nonstate actors cannot fall into 
that limited, wartime category of individuals excepted from the gen-
eral proscription against bills of attainder. 
G.  A Brief Note:  Permissible Presidential Uses of Force Against Nonstate 
Actors 
While only individuals connected to states engaged in hostilities 
with the United States can be legal enemies, and only those individu-
 
124 United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
125 Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1490 (emphases added). 
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als who also take up arms can be considered enemy combatants, it is 
important to state that force can still be constitutionally used against 
nonstate actors.  Military planning and assets can (and should) be 
used—in conjunction with traditional law enforcement assets and 
procedures—to forge an effective counterterrorism strategy.126  Noth-
ing in this Article suggests that the United States cannot legally target 
certain nonstate actors, even though the United States cannot wage 
war against them or detain them indefinitely as POWs. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in depth the in-
stances in which force may be used against nonstate actors, but in ad-
vance of a subsequent paper,127 suffice it to say that the U.S. military, 
with the President as its Commander in Chief, can engage nonstate 
actors who:  (a) take a direct part in hostilities;128 (b) commit violent 
attacks on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state;129 or 
(c) engage in action sufficiently hostile to warrant immediate meas-
ures in individual or unit self-defense.130 
Of course, so long as the nonstate actors are located in the terri-
tory of another state, the United States would have to clear the ius ad 
 
126 See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 20, at 140 (“The solution for the twenty-first century is to 
integrate legal practices with action by the armed forces.”).  See generally Bahar, supra note 
46, (proposing a “constabulary” model for naval anti-piracy and counterterrorism mis-
sions). 
127  Michael Bahar, Power Through Clarity:  How the “Old Fashioned” State-Based Laws Can Reveal 
the Strategic Power of Law for the Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009). 
128 Article 51(3) of the First Protocol to the Geneva Convention, adopted in 1977, states that:  
“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities.”  Protocol I, supra note 78, art. 51(3) (emphasis added); see 
also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 629 (Sept. 2, 1998) (con-
cluding that there is no difference in practice between “direct” and “active” involvement 
in hostilities), available at http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/15154/view/AKAYESU
%20-%20%20JUDGEMENT.pdf; Hostages Trial (Trial of Wilhelm List and Others), No. 
47 (U.S. Military Trib., Nuremberg July 8, 1947–Feb. 19, 1948), reprinted in 8 UNITED 
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 58 (1949) 
(“We think the rule is established that a civilian who aids, abets or participates in the 
fighting is liable to punishment as a war criminal under the laws of war.”).  While the 
United States has not ratified the First Protocol, it has formally endorsed this definition of 
a permissibly targeted civilian in signing (in 2000) and ratifying (in 2002) the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 236. 
129 If terrorists commit a violent act from the high seas, outer space, or some other location 
outside the jurisdiction of any state, including a failed state, then those acts can constitute 
piracy for which state repression is permissible.  See Bahar, supra note 46. 
130 See, e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of 
Engagement for U.S. Forces, Enclosure A (Jan. 15, 2000) (noting that actions in self-
defense may be taken in response to a “Hostile Act” or “Hostile Intent” with hostile act 
defined as an “attack or other use of force” and hostile intent defined as a “threat of im-
minent use of force”). 
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bellum131 hurdles as well, either through obtaining state consent or a 
Security Council Resolution, or by finding state complicity132 or a 
complete lack of a state’s ability to control the dangerous elements 
within its borders. 133  
These ius ad bellum considerations introduce yet another funda-
mental problem with expanding the targets of war to nonstate actors.  
Unless the nonstate actors are on the high seas or in some truly failed 
state, how can the United States attack them without invading an-
other sovereign country?  For example, since the 9/11 hijackers 
planned their attacks in Germany, could it be legal for the United 
States to launch cruise missiles against remaining Al Qaeda terrorist 
cells in Hamburg without German consent or without evidence that 
Germany harbored or supported the hijackers?  Would it be legal for 
the Germans to launch a cruise missile into Miami if they had action-
able intelligence that a terrorist was plotting an attack against Ger-
many in the middle floor of a high-rise, waterfront condominium? 
 
131 The United States has signed and ratified the United Nations Charter, which outlaws the 
“use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state.”  
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
132 In its 1986 decision, Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
noted that armed attacks by ostensibly nonstate actors could trigger a right of self-defense 
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provided that their conduct could be at-
tributed to a state.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶ 194 (June 27).  The standard they announced was one of “effective control.”  Id. ¶ 115.  
Even if a state does not direct the actors to attack another state, so long as that state had 
effective control over the nonstate actors, the victim-state’s retaliation into the offending 
state’s sovereign territory was justified.  See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, ¶ 146–47 (Dec. 19) (finding that 
Uganda did not have a right to self defense against the Democratic Republic of Congo 
because there was “no satisfying proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or indi-
rect, of the Government of the DRC”); Prosecutor v. Du[Ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 120, 122, 123, 131 (July 15, 1999) (holding that a State will be held ac-
countable for military acts of its groups even if the State does not issue specific instruc-
tions for the direction of individual operations or selects concrete targets if that State has 
“overall control” of those groups). 
133 See the Corfu Channel case in which states are required “not to allow knowingly its terri-
tory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”  Corfu Channel Case (U.K. 
v. Alb.) (merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).  To justify cross-border attacks on insurgents 
in Syria, administration officials to President George W. Bush cited his September 2008 
speech before the United Nations General Assembly which invoked this Corfu Channel 
principle:  “As sovereign states, we have an obligation to govern responsibly, and solve 
problems before they spill across borders . . . . We have an obligation to prevent our terri-
tory from being used as a sanctuary for terrorism and proliferation and human trafficking 
and organized crime.”  Eric Schmitt & Thom Shankar, Officials Say U.S. Killed an Iraqi in 
Raid in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at A1. 
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H.  Conclusion 
The line of cases running through Milligan, Quirin, and Eisentrager 
affirms that a state-centered conception of the enemy is a pre-
requisite for the removal of habeas and other due process protections 
(save the right to contest one’s status as an enemy).  After all, Eisen-
trager’s stated holding is quite clear and narrow:  “We hold that the 
Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an im-
munity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy en-
gaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States.”134   
Boumediene skipped this critical determination and prematurely 
moved to the pragmatic prong.  But only with the enemy block 
checked does Eisentrager support a pragmatic or strategic assessment 
of the extent of that restriction—up to and including a denial of ha-
beas.  For non-enemies, however, the pragmatic tradition that runs 
through Bas, Milligan, Quirin, Eisentrager, United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,135 Rasul v. Bush,136 and Boumediene allows us to define what is 
“reasonable” and “legitimate” to strike the constitutionally and strate-
gically appropriate balance between preserving rights and keeping 
the nation safe from its horrific foes.  But for nonstate actors, it does 
not support the complete denial of habeas absent formal suspension 
or the indefinite detention without trial. 
III.  EISENTRAGER, BOUMEDIENE, AND THE PRAGMATIC TRADITION 
The object of warfare has changed, and so must the means of 
conducting it.  In Fourth Generation warfare and counterinsurgen-
cies, in which hearts and minds are now the military objectives,137 not 
 
134 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950) (emphasis added). 
135 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
136  542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
137 See FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, at para. I-153 (“Arguably, the decisive battle is for the 
people’s minds; hence synchronizing [Information Operations] with efforts along the 
other [logical lines of operations] is critical.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL 
DEFENSE STRATEGY 8 (2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%
20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf (“This conflict is a prolonged irregular cam-
paign, a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population.”); Thomas X. 
Hammes, Insurgency:  Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, 214 STRATEGIC 
FORUM 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF214/SF214.pdf 
(“Fourth-generation warfare attempts to change the minds of enemy policymakers di-
rectly.  But this change is not to be achieved through the traditional first- through third-
generation objective of destroying the enemy’s armed forces and the capacity to regener-
ate them. . . . More relevant is the way in which specific messages are targeted toward poli-
cymakers and those who can influence them.”). 
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granting certain rights (and not training soldiers to adhere to those 
rights) undercuts those objectives.  According to Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates:   
The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terror-
ists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participa-
tion in government and economic programs to spur development, as well 
as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the 
heart of insurgencies.138 
Disparate legal treatment is one of those chief grievances.139 
Yet many modern-day theorists still hold fast to Eisentrager’s 
World War II admonitions on extending legal rights to the nation’s 
foes.140  For Justice Jackson: 
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must 
transport them across the seas for hearing.  This would require allocation 
of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations.  It might 
also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired 
to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of 
the sentence.  The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be 
equally available to enemies during active hostilities as in the present twi-
light between war and peace.  Such trials would hamper the war effort 
and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.  They would diminish the pres-
tige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neu-
trals.141 
Both Eisentrager’s progeny and its predecessors fundamentally turn 
on this negative pragmatic proposition, i.e., that it would be impracti-
cal and/or detrimental to the war effort to permit the extension of 
legal rights to enemies.  Boumediene most fully acknowledges the 
pragmatic strain within Eisentrager and constitutional law in general, 
but it only goes so far, taking a neutral or defensive position that 
there is nothing “impracticable or anomalous” about granting habeas 
 
138 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 137, at 8. 
139 For the Field Manual, “Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential,” and “[i]llegitimate 
actions” by U.S. counterinsurgents—whether committed by government officials, security 
officers, or military members—include “unlawful detention, torture, and punishment 
without trial.”  FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, at paras. I-131, I-132. 
140 See, e.g., John Yoo, Op-Ed., Congress to Courts:  ‘Get out of the War on Terror,’ WALL ST. J., Oct. 
19, 2006, at A18 (“Courts are ill-equipped to decide whether vast resources should be de-
voted to reviewing military detentions. Or whether military personnel’s time should be 
consumed traveling back to the U.S. for detainee hearings.  Or whether we risk revealing 
information in these hearings that might compromise the intelligence sources and meth-
ods that may allow us to win the war.”). 
   Justice Scalia, in his Boumediene dissent, took the admonitions to another level of ve-
hemence.  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing in detail the “disastrous consequences” of the Court’s decision). 
141 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778–79 (1950). 
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rights to detainees held in a location over which the United States 
exercises control.142 
What they lack, however, is the recognition of a positive pragmatic 
principle; i.e., that: (a) when strategically valuable and pragmatically 
viable, due process rights should be constitutionally extended, even, 
perhaps, to formal enemies; and (b) that courts can, and should, re-
view executive claims of necessity.  Times have changed, but the Con-
stitution is an intentionally pragmatic wartime document, designed to 
accommodate changing battlefield realities. 
A.  The Historical Evolution of the Positive Pragmatic Principle:  Milligan, 
Winthrop, and Yamashita 
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s Boumediene dissent, the pragmatic prin-
ciple that is critical to setting the appropriate level of due process 
rights for those who oppose the United States is central to Eisentrager.  
In fact, its roots exist in the early decisions and comments on the 
rights of detained individuals in the United States. 
In Milligan, the Supreme Court in 1866 upheld the principle that 
when it comes to war, courts can evaluate executive claims of neces-
sity to distinguish between wartime pragmatics and executive conven-
ience.143  The Court noted that, as a constitutional matter, wartime 
necessity justifies deviations from normal, constitutional protections, 
but only in precise and limited circumstances.144 Explaining the ex-
clusion of the armed forces from the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of a jury trial, for example, the Milligan majority explained:  “The dis-
cipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required 
other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common 
law courts . . . .”145 
Of the suspension of habeas corpus, the Court stated: 
In the emergency of the times, an immediate public investigation accord-
ing to law may not be possible; and yet, the peril to the country may be 
too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large.  Unquestionably, 
there is then an exigency which demands that the government, if it 
should see fit in the exercise of a proper discretion to make arrests, 
 
142 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
143 See generally Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (discussing the necessity of mili-
tary tribunals during the late Civil War). 
144 See, e.g., id. at 40–41 (identifying the constitutional provision allowing for the suspension 
of habeas corpus as a limitation, and not a grant, of power). 
145 Id. at 123. 
 
Jan. 2009] AS NECESSITY CREATES THE RULE 309 
 
should not be required to produce the persons arrested in answer to a 
writ of habeas corpus.146 
And of the permissibility of martial law, the Court again found 
wholly pragmatic triggers for its application. 
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is 
impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the 
theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a 
necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to 
preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the 
military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have 
their free course.147 
But the important implication is that courts, if open and func-
tional, can constitutionally review government claims of necessity, 
and “[a]s necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration.”148  For 
the Court, unless an individual is a proper enemy,149 military trials and 
the denial of habeas, absent formal suspension, can “never exist 
where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exer-
cise of their jurisdiction.”150  Importantly, the Court added that “[i]t is 
also confined to the locality of actual war.”151 
In contrast to many war on terror cases which have been marked 
by parsing of precedent to determine how the Framers must have his-
torically understood the extension of habeas protections to aliens 
prior to the time of ratifying the Constitution, Milligan views the 
Framers as pragmatic men framing a pragmatic document for war-
time.  While it was “not without precedents in English and American 
history illustrating our views of this question,” the Court explained, it 
was “hardly necessary to make particular reference to them.”152  It 
would have been enough for the Milligan majority to strike down the 
Executive’s attempt to try a civilian by military commission to observe 
that the Framers knew that the nation “cannot always remain at 
peace, and has no right to expect that it will always have wise and 
humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitu-
tion.”153 
 
146 Id. at 125–26. 
147 Id. at 127. 
148 Id. 
149 Or, at that time, a member of the “land or naval forces, or in the militia” of the United 
States. Id. at 118–19. 
150 Id. at 127. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 128. 
153 Id. at 125. 
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If our fathers had failed to provide for just such a contingency, they 
would have been false to the trust reposed in them.  They knew—the his-
tory of the world told them—the nation they were founding, be its exis-
tence short or long, would be involved in war . . . and that unlimited 
power, wherever lodged at such time, was especially hazardous to free-
men.154 
Upon review, the Court determined that the post-Civil War Gov-
ernment’s actions failed to meet the precise standards of necessity 
that the Framers foresaw and enshrined, and it rejected the execu-
tive’s attempt to try Milligan, a civilian nonstate actor, as an enemy. 
The nineteenth century’s “Blackstone of Military Law,” Colonel 
Winthrop,155 similarly interpreted restrictive battlefield rules as spring-
ing from limited battlefield necessities, and emphasized the role of 
the courts.  Colonel Winthrop recognized that indefinite detention 
for enemy combatants was “neither a punishment nor an act of 
vengeance, but merely a temporary detention which is devoid of all 
penal character,” necessary for successful prosecution of war.156  But, 
as his fifth condition for the proper exercise of jurisdiction by a tri-
bunal, Winthrop echoes Milligan in stating that “the trial must be had 
within the theatre of war . . . ; that, if held elsewhere, and where the 
civil courts are open and available, the proceedings and sentence will be 
coram non judice.”157  For both Milligan and Winthrop, it is military ne-
cessity on the actual battlefield that justifies deviations from normal 
rules.158  But as necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration—and 
courts have a role in determining whether that necessity exists. 
 
154 Id. 
155 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion) (citing the work of 
Colonel Winthrop, whose treatise, Military Law and Precedents, has become the touchstone 
for many recent detainee decisions).  See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 
(2006), and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004), both of which quote works writ-
ten by Colonel Winthrop. 
156 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (2d rev. ed. 1920) (1896) (cita-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 Id. at 836 (second emphasis added). 
158 Despite the explicit removal from U.S. military members of constitutional provisions like 
the right to a jury trial, service members today are entitled to juries, in addition to 
Miranda-type rights and other due process protections, because eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century necessities are no longer the rule.  See Robert S. Poydasheff & William K. 
Suter, Military Justice?—Definitely!, 49 TUL. L. REV. 588, 591 (1975) (summarizing due 
process protections afforded accused service members and noting that, for example, the 
right to counsel is only excepted in “rare circumstances, such as on an isolated ship on 
the high seas or in a unit in an inaccessible area, provided compelling reasons exist why 
trial must be held at that time and at that place” but that “[m]ere inconvenience does not 
constitute a physical condition or military exigency” (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, MANUAL 
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES para. 153a (rev. ed. 1969))); Francis A. Gilligan, 
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Even though the continuing validity of In re Yamashita159 has re-
cently been called into serious question,160 it is nonetheless instructive 
on the role of pragmatics and of judicial checks on executive claims 
of necessity.  It represents the only Supreme Court decision on de-
tainees in which pure “legalism”161 trumped pragmatics.  In Yamashita, 
the Court held that a military commission had jurisdiction to try a 
Japanese commander for failing to prevent troops under his com-
mand from committing atrocities in the Philippines.162  The Hamdan 
majority, in discrediting Yamashita’s precedential value, turned to 
Yamashita’s dissenting opinions to explain that “[a]mong the dissent-
ers’ primary concerns was that the commission had free rein to con-
sider all evidence ‘which in the commission’s opinion “would be of 
assistance in proving or disproving the charge,” without any of the 
usual modes of authentication.’”163 
However, the Yamashita dissenters had other concerns as well, 
which dealt with pragmatics and questioned the executive’s claims of 
necessity.  In fact, the thrust of Justice Murphy’s dissent was how the 
majority’s legal reasoning deviated from the strategic reality: 
  In other words, read against the background of military events in the 
Philippines subsequent to October 9, 1944, these charges amount to this:  
“We, the victorious American forces, have done everything possible to 
destroy and disorganize your lines of communication, your effective con-
trol of your personnel, your ability to wage war.  In those respects we have 
succeeded.  We have defeated and crushed your forces.  And now we 
charge and condemn you for having been inefficient in maintaining con-
trol of your troops during the period when we were so effectively besieg-
ing and eliminating your forces and blocking your ability to maintain ef-
fective control. . . . In short, we charge you with the crime of inefficiency 
in controlling your troops.  We will judge the discharge of your duties by 
the disorganization which we ourselves created in large part.”164 
 
The Bill of Rights and Service Members, 1987 ARMY LAW. 3, 9 (discussing the rules of evidence 
and jury procedures applied to military trials). 
159 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
160 See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 617–18 (“The procedures and evidentiary rules used to try 
General Yamashita near the end of World War II deviated in significant respects from 
those then governing courts-martial.  The force of that precedent, however, has been se-
riously undermined by post-World War II developments.” (citation omitted)). 
161 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 30 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
162 The majority found that General Yamashita, as military governor of the Philippines and 
the commander of Japanese forces there, had “an affirmative duty to take such measures 
as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war 
and the civilian population.”  Id. at 16. 
163 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 618 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)). 
164 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 34–35 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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Similarly, Justice Rutledge lambasted the majority for not appreci-
ating that “[m]ore is at stake than General Yamashita’s fate.”165  While 
wartime considerations necessitate legal restrictions under Milligan, 
once the hostilities have ceased, as they had in the Pacific, Justice 
Rutledge explained that “there is no longer the danger which always 
exists before surrender and armistice.  Military necessity does not 
demand the same measures.”166  In other words, for the dissent, as 
military necessity creates the rule, so must it limit its duration. 
For the majority, at least they rejected the government’s “obnox-
ious” assertion that restraints of liberty resulting from military trials of 
war criminals are political matters completely outside the realm of 
judicial review.167  By doing so, they reaffirmed the proposition that 
courts have a role in evaluating presidential and military claims of 
necessity and that, at a minimum, detainees have the right to contest 
their status as enemies. 
But the Yamashita majority nonetheless stuck to its “false legal-
ism,”168 and left the dissent to sound the alarm on ignoring the posi-
tive pragmatic considerations.  Presaging the arguments General Pet-
raeus would make in the Field Manual, Justice Murphy writes: 
  At a time like this when emotions are understandably high it is diffi-
cult to adopt a dispassionate attitude toward a case of this nature.  Yet 
now is precisely the time when that attitude is most essential.  While peo-
ples in other lands may not share our beliefs as to due process and the 
dignity of the individual, we are not free to give effect to our emotions in 
reckless disregard of the rights of others. . . . Indeed, an uncurbed spirit 
of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure for pur-
poses of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting 
harm than all of the atrocities giving rise to that spirit.  The people’s faith 
in the fairness and objectiveness of the law can be seriously undercut by 
that spirit.  The fires of nationalism can be further kindled.  And the 
hearts of all mankind can be embittered and filled with hatred, leaving 
forlorn and impoverished the noble ideal of malice toward none and 
charity to all.169 
 
165 Id. at 41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 46. 
167 Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 40–41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
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B.  The Modern Pragmatic Tradition:  Quirin, Eisentrager, and 
Boumediene 
Pragmatics lost out in Yamashita, but the principle survived with 
the advent of Eisentrager four years later.  As discussed above, Eisen-
trager pronounced a two-part test: 
[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the 
service of the enemy, does not have even this qualified access to our 
courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon our institutions nor could his 
use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy.170 
Constitutionally, therefore, an enemy falls into a narrow legal 
category in which due process rights—up to and including the right 
of habeas corpus—can be curtailed to a degree pragmatically and 
strategically determined.  Functionally, these rights have always been 
limitable because failing to do so would hamper the war effort and 
because there would be no reciprocity from the enemy. 
How Eisentrager differs from Quirin reveals that it was the prag-
matic element that proved dispositive.  In Quirin, the Court granted 
habeas review but upheld military commissions for eight German 
saboteurs who landed along the East Coast of the United States.  Un-
derlying the Court’s decision to uphold military commissions was first 
that the defendants were actual enemies, and second that by stashing 
their uniforms, the Germans were violating the principle of distinc-
tion and were thus “subject to trial and punishment by military tribu-
nals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”171  Looking to 
the Hague Regulations and the 1940 Rules of Land Warfare promul-
gated by the U.S. War Department, the Quirin Court found the eight 
saboteurs in violation of the distinction principle by “passing our 
boundaries for such [unlawful] purposes without uniform or other 
emblem signifying their belligerent status.”172 
 
170 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950) (emphasis added). 
171 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942). 
172 Id. at 37; see also William H. Ferrell, III, No Shirt, No Shoes, No Status:  Uniforms, Distinction, 
and Special Operations in International Armed Conflict, 178 MIL. L. REV. 94, 128 (2003) (con-
cluding that “[t]hus, the Court based its decision, in part, on the principle of distinc-
tion”).  Ferrell also notes, however, that technically the Quirin holding conflicts with the 
Hague Regulations upon which it “at least in part, rested” because the eight saboteurs 
could have been guilty of espionage, which while a violation of domestic laws, is permissi-
ble under international law.  Id. at 129. 
   Incidentally, this principle of distinction derives from the pragmatic decision among 
the negotiating states to limit superfluous suffering and destruction in the midst of hos-
tilities.  As Robert Sloane makes clear, the principle is “not a moral one” but one born of 
a negotiated-for, pragmatic desire.  Sloane, supra note 63, at 458–59.  See also Daphné 
Richemond, Transnational Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Force, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 
 
 
314 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
But, while the Quirin and Eisentrager defendants were both subject 
to military trial as enemy combatants, the reason the former were ex-
tended habeas rights and the latter were not was because of pragmat-
ics.173  The Eisentrager dissent accurately noted that “[s]ince the 
Court . . . disavows conflict with the Quirin . . . decision[],” the Court 
“must be relying not on the status of these petitioners as alien enemy 
belligerents but rather on the fact that they were captured, tried and 
imprisoned outside our territory.”174  Essentially, the dissent was notic-
ing (while not agreeing) that something about their location and 
captors, contrary to the defendants in Quirin, would make it more 
helpful to the enemy to extend legal rights.  Unlike the Eisentrager de-
fendants, the Quirin defendants were well within reach of the open 
and functioning federal courts, and the witnesses and captors were 
FBI agents versus soldiers.  As Justice Jackson stated for the majority: 
Reliance on the Quirin case is clearly mistaken.  Those prisoners were in 
custody in the District of Columbia.  One was, or claimed to be, a citizen.  
They were tried by a Military Commission sitting in the District of Co-
lumbia at a time when civil courts were open and functioning normally.  
They were arrested by civil authorities and the prosecution was personally 
directed by the Attorney General, a civilian prosecutor, for acts commit-
ted in the United States. . . . None of the places where they were acting, 
arrested, tried or imprisoned were, it was contended, in a zone of active 
military operations or under martial law or any other military control, 
and no circumstances justified transferring them from civil to military ju-
risdiction.  None of these grave grounds for challenging military jurisdic-
tion can be urged in the case now before us.175 
Yet, while pragmatics proved the decisive difference, the prag-
matic element in Eisentrager had been overshadowed by the belief that 
Eisentrager pronounced a categorical rule denying nonresident aliens 
due process rights.176  With the 1990 decision in United States v. Ver-
 
1001, 1017–18, 1027–33 (2007), for a discussion on the historical and philosophical un-
derpinnings of the principle of distinction. 
173 Although, of course, the Supreme Court did entertain Eisentrager’s challenge and issued 
a detailed ruling. 
174 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 795 (Black, J., dissenting). 
175 Id. at 779–80. 
176 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2298 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
purports to derive from our precedents a ‘functional’ test for the extraterritorial reach of 
the writ which shows that the Military Commissions Act unconstitutionally restricts the 
scope of habeas.  That is remarkable because the most pertinent of those precedents, 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, conclusively establishes the opposite.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Fletcher, supra note 56, at 127 (explaining that Eisentrager “leaves us . . . with two argu-
ments for the government’s position”:  one predicated on “war as a conflict between na-
tions,” and one emphasizing the “inefficiency of applying the rule of law in the battle-
field”). 
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dugo-Urquidez,177 however, Justice Kennedy began to unearth the 
pragmatic prong underlying Eisentrager.  In the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Rehnquist drew on Eisentrager to warn of the legal implications of 
expanding Fourth Amendment protections outside the United States, 
which, he wrote, could “plunge [American officials] into a sea of un-
certainty.”178  Noting that the United States “frequently employs 
Armed Forces outside this country . . . for the protection of American 
citizens or national security,” Justice Rehnquist concluded that apply-
ing the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances “could signifi-
cantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to for-
eign situations involving our national interest.”179 
But Justice Kennedy’s concurrence—widely and correctly viewed 
as the controlling opinion regarding extraterritorial application180—
explained that what matters most for any extension of constitutional 
rights are actually the practical implications of that extension.  There 
is no hard and fast proscription on constitutional extension, he 
wrote, but “there are provisions in the Constitution which do not nec-
essarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place.”181  For Jus-
tice Kennedy, the basic teaching of In re Ross182 and the Insular Cases183 
is that, 
there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition prece-
dent to exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it sub-
ject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the condi-
tions and considerations are that would make adherence to a specific 
guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous.184 
He then extended this pragmatic assessment to non-Americans.  
He concurred in the judgment restricting Fourth Amendment appli-
cation over a Mexican defendant whose home in Mexico was 
searched by  American officials for primarily practical reasons.  “The 
conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to 
 
177 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
178 Id. at 274. 
179 Id. at 273–74. 
180 See, e.g., United States v. Boynes, 149 F.3d 208, 211 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Justice Ken-
nedy’s separate concurrence); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 n.7 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(same); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 974 (1991) (same). 
181 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
182 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
183 The cases that are collectively known as the Insular Cases are Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 
298 (1922), Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 
(1903), and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
184 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and 
anomalous.”185  Specifically, he stated: 
The absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the 
differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness 
and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign 
officials all indicate that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country.186 
Based on this reasoning and the pragmatics of the global war on 
terror, however, Justice Kennedy found in 2008 that there is nothing 
impractical or anomalous about extending constitutional protections 
to aliens or citizens either captured in the United States or detained 
in an area where the United States exercises de facto sovereignty and 
control.187 
The next step in this progression should be to understand that 
when pragmatics require fuller extension of detainee rights, even for 
formal enemies like those in Quirin, the Constitution similarly re-
quires it; for if the necessity of the deviation goes away, so too does 
the restrictive rule. 
IV.  THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF LAW 
As the Army and Marine Corps’ own doctrine now makes clear, 
military necessity in counterinsurgency (“COIN”) campaigns of the 
type fought in Iraq and Afghanistan now require “[e]stablishing the 
rule of law” over there,188 as well as the impartial application and re-
spect for the law in the United States.  As one of its key “unsuccessful 
practices” of counterinsurgencies, the Field Manual lists:  “Ignore 
peacetime government processes, including legal procedures.”189  The 
Field Manual also wisely warns that “[a]ny human rights abuses or le-
gal violations by U.S. forces quickly become known throughout the 
local populace and eventually around the world.”190  These actions 
“undermine” the war effort, both in the “long- and short-term.”191 
Each of the major U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the extension 
of rights to enemies have thus far turned on the dangers involved in 
extending rights, even while they more recently have resisted at-
 
185 Id. at 278. 
186 Id. 
187 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that detainees “are enti-
tled to the privilege of habeus corpus to challenge the legality of their detention”). 
188 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, at app. D, para. D-38. 
189 Id. at tbl.I-I. 
190 Id. at para. I-132. 
191 Id. 
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tempts to curtail those rights.  It has been left to the dissents, as in 
Yamashita, to sound the alarm of what will happen when rights are 
not extended: 
The high feelings of the moment doubtless will be satisfied.  But in the 
sober afterglow will come the realization of the boundless and dangerous 
implications of the procedure sanctioned today.  No one in a position of 
command in an army, from sergeant to general, can escape those impli-
cations.  Indeed, the fate of some future President of the United States 
and his chiefs of staff and military advisers may well have been sealed by 
this decision.  But even more significant will be the hatred and ill-will 
growing out of the application of this unprecedented procedure.192 
Even the Israeli Supreme Court, which upheld restrictions on its 
military despite powerful arguments of necessity, acknowledged that 
the restrictions it was imposing handcuffed the military.193  “That is 
the fate of democracy,” Justice Barak wrote in a 1999 case involving 
interrogation methods, which he then cited in a 2007 case involving 
targeted killings.194  “[I]n [democracy’s] eyes not all means are per-
mitted, and . . . not all the methods used by her enemies are open.”195  
At times, “democracy fights with one hand tied behind her back.”196 
Justice Barak comes closest to realizing the affirmative value of 
law, but his peroration stops short of recognizing the positive prag-
matics or the strategic value of law: 
Despite that, democracy has the upper hand, since preserving the rule of 
law and recognition of individual liberties constitute an important com-
ponent of her security stance.  At the end of the day, they strengthen her 
spirit, and allow her to overcome her difficulties.197 
The Field Manual, written by military officers including the general 
who would go on to lead the U.S. war in Iraq and would ultimately be 
selected to assume military responsibility over the entire region, 
demonstrates that upholding the law not only reminds the counterin-
surgents of who they are and what they are fighting for, but it accom-
plishes a strategic imperative.  American generals are not alone in 
this view.  For example, British general Sir Rupert Smith, former 
commander of the British Armoured Division in the first Gulf War in 
 
192 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 28 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
193 See The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 46 I.L.M. 375 (Isr. S. Ct. 
2007) (limiting the ability of the Israeli military to engage in targeted strikes against Pal-
estinian terrorists); HCJ 5100/94 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel 
[1999] 53(4) PD 817 (limiting the interrogation methods used by the Israeli military). 
194 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, 46 I.L.M. at 402 (quoting HCJ 5100/94 The 
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, 53(4) PD 817). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 402–03. 
197 Id. at 403. 
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1991 and later the leader for UNPROFOR, the U.N. Protection Force 
in Bosnia, states that “if we are to operate amongst the people . . . we 
must do so within the law.  To do otherwise is to attack the essence of 
our own strategic objective, which is to establish and uphold the 
law.”198 
A.  Lawyers as Tactical Commanders? 
Legal adherence, as many prominent commentators have argued, 
does not necessarily attach a yoke on America’s power.  In his Foreign 
Affairs review of General Wesley Clark’s book on the Balkan Wars, 
Richard Betts, for example, decried the role of law and lawyers in the 
Kosovo campaign as well as in military interventions in general.199  He 
asserts that “[t]he hyperlegalism applied to NATO’s campaign made 
the conflict reminiscent of the quaint norms of premodern war.”200  
Further, he alleges that “lawyers constrained even the preparation of 
options for decisive combat” and declares: 
  One of the most striking features of the Kosovo campaign, in fact, 
was the remarkably direct role lawyers played in managing combat opera-
tions—to a degree unprecedented in previous wars. . . . The role played 
by lawyers in this war should also be sobering—indeed alarming—for 
devotees of power politics who denigrate the impact of law on interna-
tional conflict. . . .   
  . . . . 
 
198 Andy Salmon & Mary Kaldor, Principles for the Use of the Military in Support of Law Enforce-
ment Operations:  Implementing the European Security Strategy, in A HUMAN SECURITY 
DOCTRINE:  PROJECT, PRINCIPLES, PRACTICALITIES 231, 234 (Marlies Glasius & Mary Kaldor 
eds., 2005), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/publications/humansecurity
report/principlessalmonkaldor.pdf; see also David Scheffer, Comment, The Legal Double 
Standards of Bush’s War, FIN. TIMES (London), May 6, 2004, at 21 (“The brutality at Abu 
Ghraib, rapidly assuming the heritage of the My Lai massacre by US troops in Vietnam, 
will doubtless scar the American psyche and cripple US influence in the Arab world for 
years.  US government investigations into detainee abuse in Iraq and elsewhere will 
probably not be sufficient to restore credibility.”). 
199 Richard K. Betts, Review Essay, Compromised Command:  Inside NATO’s First War, 80 
FOREIGN AFF. 126, 129–30 (2001) (reviewing WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR:  
BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT (2001)); see also Glenn Sulmasy & John 
Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military:  A Rational Choice Approach to the War on 
Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1844–45 (2007) (“Civilian leaders should remain aware that 
the growth in JAG influence can have a detrimental impact on the nation’s ability to win 
wars.  Leaders have allowed a regime to arise in which the JAGs advise, within the con-
fines of the law, the best means of achieving military objectives.  American combat offi-
cers must now seek out JAGs for rulings on the incorporation of the law of armed conflict 
into their ongoing operations.  It is no coincidence that this unprecedented role for JAGs 
developed at the same time that severe problems in civilian control over the military oc-
curred in the wake of the Cold War.”). 
200 Betts, supra note 199, at 129–30. 
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  . . . NATO’s lawyers . . . became, in effect, its tactical commanders.201 
In his thoughtful and balanced analysis of “lawfare”—i.e., the use 
of law as a weapon of war against the United States—Major General 
Charles Dunlap is less pessimistic about the law of armed conflict’s 
ability to limit U.S. power, but he concludes that while the role of the 
law and lawyers in the U.S. military exists for practical and altruistic 
reasons, “there is disturbing evidence that the rule of law is being hi-
jacked into just another way of fighting (lawfare), to the detriment of 
humanitarian values as well as the law itself.”202 
While law no doubt constrains the tactical use of American 
power—and America’s enemies certainly can use its respect for the 
law against it in the short term—the Field Manual demonstrates that 
the top military commanders now understand law to be essential to 
maximizing the strategic use of American power in twenty-first cen-
tury conflicts.  Force is still necessary, but it must be used with re-
straint, discrimination, and in strict compliance with the laws of war, 
or it “risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that mo-
tivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.”203  While the 
Field Manual is not the last word in twenty-first century military strat-
egy,204 and while warfare will always evolve and great power struggles 
will rise again, the time for knee-jerk antipathy towards law on a stra-
tegic level is over.205 
B.  The Fuller Range of Benefits 
And even the Field Manual itself does not fully account for the full 
range of benefits adherence to law provides.  For example, law and 
legal procedures force actors to think; they allow actors to practice 
pre-planned responses or “PPRs”; they force actors, including the 
 
201 Id. 
202 CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., CARR CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LAW AND MILITARY 
INTERVENTIONS:  PRESERVING HUMANITARIAN VALUES IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 6 
(2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/WebWorkingPapers/Useof
Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
203 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, at para. I-128. 
204 See, e.g., Charles C. Dunlap, Jr., Op-Ed., We Still Need the Big Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008, 
at A19 (providing a thoughtful argument for “old-fashioned force” in addition to the new 
counterinsurgency manual). 
205 Perhaps beginning to appreciate this fact, the Government in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli did 
not “seek[] judicial deference to decisions of ‘military officers who are engaged in the se-
rious work of waging battle,’ [but rather asked for deference] to the ‘multi-agency evalua-
tion process’ of government bureaucrats in Washington made eighteen months after al-
Marri was taken into custody.”  534 F.3d 213, 232 (2008) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 531–32 (2004)), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 680 (Dec. 5, 2008) (No. 08-368). 
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President, to internalize costs of their actions; and of course, they re-
strain all actors from going too far.  Law is also a trip wire, signaling 
to actors that some value is worth protecting, and if they continue on 
that path, it better be for a good reason.  Historically, this country has 
looked back in shame and horror at some of its wartime excesses, be 
they the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II206 or 
the thousands of Americans who lost their livelihoods, reputations, 
and even freedom during the McCarthy era.  Courts could have pre-
vented these baleful and counterproductive events by interposing 
themselves more to enforce the appropriate legal hurdles.207 
Finally, while high-level Bush administration lawyers like David 
Addington208 and influential commentators like Robert Kagan209 still 
view “law and force as antonyms,”210 and while many still assert that 
the United States can operate independently of allies, the realities of 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the overall war on terror have proven other-
wise.  Adherence to the law is key to obtaining partners.  As Stephen 
Walt has persuasively argued, “[w]hen foreign populations disap-
prove of U.S. policy and are fearful of U.S. dominance, their govern-
ments are less likely to endorse Washington’s initiatives and more 
likely to look for ways to hinder them.”211  The experiences of Mat-
thew Waxman, one of the Bush administration’s key national security 
lawyers and now a professor at Columbia Law School, reinforce this 
point.  Using the Guantanamo Bay detention facility as an example, 
he writes that the “widespread perception that it exists simply to keep 
detainees forever beyond the reach of the law” is “a drag on Amer-
ica’s . . . global counterterrorism efforts,” hampering “cooperation 
 
206 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the reasons given for the Japanese internment). 
207 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2002) (arguing that a “double 
standard” or impartial application of the law on the basis of citizenship is detrimental for 
three reasons:  “It is normatively and constitutionally wrong; it undermines our security 
interests; and it will pave the way for future inroads on citizens’ liberties”). 
208 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 130 (2007) (describing “lawyers’ unusual influence on terrorism policy,” 
especially that of Vice-President Cheney’s lawyer, David Addington, and ascribing as one 
of the causes of that phenomenon “that the war itself was encumbered with legal restric-
tions as never before”). 
209 See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER:  AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER 3 (2003) (arguing that Europe is becoming “a self-contained world of 
laws” while the United States is a place “where international laws and rules are unreli-
able”). 
210 STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR’S CAPE:  AMERICA’S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO TERROR 76 
(2007). 
211 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 109 (2005). 
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with our friends on such critical counterterrorism tasks as informa-
tion sharing, joint military operations and law enforcement.”212  “I 
know,” he continues, “[a]s a State Department official, I often spent 
valuable time and diplomatic capital fruitlessly defending our deten-
tion practices rather than fostering counterterrorism teamwork.”213 
The United States may be able to topple a country by itself with 
shock and awe, but it cannot win the peace, or keep its borders safe, 
without international involvement.214  Germany’s summer 2007 arrest 
of Islamic militants allegedly planning to target the United States 
demonstrates this point.215  The Field Manual and high-level national 
security documents also recognize the essential force multiplier of 
coalition involvement.  As President George W. Bush’s National 
Strategy for Maritime Security rightly concludes: 
[E]ven an enhanced national effort is not sufficient.  The challenges that 
remain ahead for the United States, the adversaries we confront, and the 
environment in which we operate compel us to strengthen our ties with 
allies and friends and to seek new partnerships with others.  Therefore, 
international cooperation is critical to ensuring that lawful private and 
public activities in the maritime domain are protected from attack and 
hostile or unlawful exploitation.216 
Maximizing coalition involvement requires maximizing adherence 
to U.S. and international law. 
 
212 Matthew Waxman, The Smart Way to Shut Gitmo Down, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at B4. 
213 Id.; see also Samantha Power, Our War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, § 7, at 8 (Book 
Review) (“While our allies still share intelligence with us in order to combat domestic ter-
rorism, our disavowal of international law has made it harder for our friends to contrib-
ute military and even financial resources to shore up failing states like Afghanistan, which 
is portrayed by the opposition in countries like Canada and the Netherlands as one of 
Bush’s wars.  Many of our friends believe that too close an association with American ob-
jectives will make them electorally vulnerable and their cities potential targets.”). 
214 See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 210, at 79 (arguing that Robert Kagan’s view that Europe 
“‘has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms’ . . . [is] fallacious [to 
say] the very least” (internal citations omitted)).  Professor Holmes also quotes Steve 
Simon and Daniel Benjamin to emphasize the importance of Europe: 
The rise of Islamic radicalism in the West is not something the United States can 
deal with militarily.  At least as the world exists now, Washington will not be dis-
patching troops to fight in the Paris suburbs.  But the growth of radicalism in 
Europe does require that the United States and its allies deepen their intelligence 
and law enforcement cooperation to the greatest possible extent to thwart terrorist 
operations. 
  Id. (quoting DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK:  THE FAILURE OF THE 
WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT 202 (2005)). 
215 See, e.g., Mark Landler, Germany Seizes 3 It Says Planned Terror Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2007, at A1 (describing international cooperation to prevent an attack against German 
and American targets). 
216 DEP’T OF DEF. & HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 25 
(2005). 
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V.  THE BATTLEFIELD PRESUMPTION 
With the Field Manual, law and strategy are now officially and doc-
trinally aligned.  In Guantanamo Bay, facts of sovereignty and mod-
ern technology indicate that there is nothing impractical or anoma-
lous about at least giving detainees the right to contest their status as 
enemies.  The Constitution requires that courts recognize strategic 
and pragmatic realities and, where appropriate, expand the applica-
tion of certain constitutional provisions to U.S. enemies and those 
the government captures in the global struggle against terrorism. 
But this is not to say that the constitutional extension should be in 
constant flux, or that a court should scrutinize the nature of a conflict 
too soon or interject itself too much.  Rather, this Article posits a 
careful battlefield presumption within the context of a general war-
time jurisprudence.  Instead of debating whether law should apply in 
the “new paradigm,” as Justice Thomas puts it,217 it is better to design 
appropriate rules to maximize the chances for peace based on the 
best possible American terms, which includes optimizing the exten-
sion of constitutional principles. 
Boumediene explicitly opened the door for this battlefield jurispru-
dence.  Justice Kennedy stated: 
  In cases involving foreign citizens detained abroad by the Executive, 
it likely would be both an impractical and unprecedented extension of 
judicial power to assume that habeas corpus would be available at the 
moment the prisoner is taken into custody.  If and when habeas corpus 
jurisdiction applies, as it does in these cases, then proper deference can 
be accorded to reasonable procedures for screening and initial detention 
under lawful and proper conditions of confinement and treatment for a 
reasonable period of time.  Domestic exigencies, furthermore, might also 
impose such onerous burdens on the Government that here, too, the Ju-
dicial Branch would be required to devise sensible rules for staying ha-
beas corpus proceedings until the Government can comply with its re-
quirements in a responsible way.218 
 
217 Dissenting in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice Thomas wrote: 
Indeed, respecting the present conflict, the President has found that “the war 
against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, in-
ternational reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with 
the direct support of states.  Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm—
ushered in not by us, but by terrorists—requires new thinking in the law of war.”  
Under the Court’s approach, the President’s ability to address this “new paradigm” 
of inflicting death and mayhem would be completely frozen by rules developed in 
the context of conventional warfare. 
  548 U.S. 557, 691 n.6 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
218 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008). 
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At the far end of the spectrum, enemies captured on the battle-
field should have a constitutional right to contest their status as ene-
mies and combatants.219  But even battlefield captures and seizures 
should not necessarily be subject to a categorical denial of all other 
constitutional privileges since, as the top military officers make clear, 
U.S. military policy is better off with a certain degree of law.  Rather, 
precedent dictates that the United States should adjust the extension 
of rules based on the strategic and practical implications of doing so.  
And, as the detained individual moves away from the constitutional, 
state-based understanding of an enemy, his level of due process pro-
tections should increase the further away he is from the battlefield. 
Professors Fallon and Meltzer have produced a magisterial work 
which provides a sound analytical framework for sorting out “the tan-
gle of jurisdictional, substantive, procedural, and scope-of-review is-
sues that habeas cases often present.”220  Much of that framework 
turns on the individual’s status as an alien or citizen, and on his or 
her place of capture and detention.  Methodologically, their article 
also advocates a common law-like approach to habeas adjudication 
under which courts must exercise responsible judgment in adapting 
both statutory and constitutional language to “novel circum-
stances.”221 
What they do not fully appreciate, however, is that a common law-
like approach is not necessary because the original understanding of 
the Constitution and the precedent permit strategic and pragmatic 
assessments.  Decision-making in this context comes closer to what 
Fallon and Meltzer call the “Agency Model,”222 as strictly “applying the 
law, not making it”223 permits the evaluation of pragmatic and strate-
gic circumstances. 
Fallon and Meltzer also do not fully appreciate the paradigmatic 
shift in the strategic realities which can accommodate a larger expan-
 
219 As a matter of U.S. treaty obligations, captured enemies already have this right under the 
Geneva Conventions:  
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act 
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal. 
  Third Geneva Convention, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War art. 5, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
220 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and 
the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (2007). 
221 Id. at 2033. 
222 Id. (“The Agency Model seeks to restrict courts to applying the law, not making it.”). 
223 Id. 
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sion of rights than they anticipate.  They view Eisentrager as rightly de-
cided so long as it stands for the proposition that aliens detained 
abroad “generally” have no constitutional right to habeas, but that 
the possibility is left open that “a small subset of aliens might have suf-
ficient contacts with the United States to possess both substantive 
constitutional rights and a constitutional right of access to a court to 
assert those rights.”224  As an extension of that argument, they proffer 
a battlefield rule with regard to citizens.  They write that “[w]ithout 
attempting to anticipate every imaginable scenario, we would follow 
this general principle:  the central distinction for purposes of apprais-
ing the legality, and ultimately the constitutionality, of executive de-
tentions of American citizens is between battlefield and nonbattle-
field contexts, not between seizures at home and those abroad.”225  
Bowing to the stories of battlefield exigencies, they posit that “[i]n all 
nonbattlefield cases, seizure and detention of citizens should rest on 
evidence that has been carefully assembled and is reasonably capable 
of being maintained.”226 
But this principle can be extended even further.  Fallon and Melt-
zer operate under the implicit assumption that the military is distinct 
from the police force, in both function and capacity.  Their position 
that, in “all nonbattlefield cases,” the seizure and detention of citi-
zens should rest on evidence that has been carefully assembled and is 
reasonably capable of being maintained, implies that such careful as-
sembly is not possible in the military context.  “Imagine moving de-
tainees, witnesses, or lawyers around in Baghdad today to develop 
evidence for a habeas proceeding,” 227 they ask. 
But this sharp divide between military and police actions is not 
necessarily true on the twenty-first century battlefield.  As the Field 
Manual states:  “In counterinsurgencies, warfighting and policing are 
dynamically linked.”228  While “[t]here is a clear difference between 
warfighting and policing . . . [counterinsurgency] operations require 
that every unit be adept at both and capable of moving rapidly be-
 
224 Id. at 2056 (emphasis added). 
225 Id. at 2081. 
226 Id.  Accordingly, they would not read the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), as authorizing the indefinite executive detention of an 
American citizen seized anywhere other than on a battlefield.  Fallon & Meltzer, supra 
note 220, at 2081–82 (“Even if Congress were plainly to state its intention to authorize a 
broader range of executive detentions, we believe that the purported authorization 
should be deemed unconstitutional absent a valid suspension of the writ.”). 
227 Id. at 2057. 
228 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, at para. 7-26. 
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tween one and the other.”229  The Field Manual also reminds operators 
that every insurgent is a “criminal suspect[]” and thus evidence must 
be properly documented and preserved.230 
In the asymmetric battlefield of this century, the traditional mili-
tary functions are being increasingly fused with the police functions, 
even outside of the strict counterinsurgency context.  As I have dem-
onstrated elsewhere, the Navy, for example, is being increasingly 
called upon to police the seas against pirates, maritime terrorists, and 
traffickers in illicit materials by sea.231  Given this reality, and drawing 
on my own experiences capturing and detaining Somali pirates, I 
have argued that the United States should design procedural rules 
for the at-sea or battlefield capture rather than either assume, or take 
the position, that no procedural rules apply.232 
While the Patriot Act233 is highly controversial, and many of its 
provisions have not been fully tested in the courts, it nevertheless 
demonstrates that the United States is already tailoring procedural 
rules to accommodate certain realities.  For example, the Patriot Act 
authorizes the Attorney General to detain any alien whom he “has 
reasonable grounds to believe” is “described in” certain sections of 
United States Code.234  These code sections “describe” aliens who:  (1) 
“seek[] to enter the United States” to “violate any law of the United 
States relating to espionage or sabotage” or to use “force, violence, or 
other unlawful means” in opposition to the government of the 
United States; (2) have “engaged in a terrorist activity;” or (3) the At-
torney General believes are “likely to engage after entry in any terror-
ist activity,” have “incited terrorist activity,” are “representative[s]” or 
“member[s] of a terrorist organization” or are “representative[s]” of a 
group that “endorses or espouses terrorist activity,” or have “received 
military-type training” from a terrorist organization.235 
But, it requires that the Attorney General step through procedural 
checks.  The Act expressly prohibits unlimited indefinite detention 
 
229 Id.; see also id. at paras. 6-90 to 6-105 (addressing in detail the role, organizing, and train-
ing of police forces in counterinsurgency operations). 
230 Id. at para. D-15. 
231 See generally Bahar, supra note 46. 
232 Id. at 44–56 (discussing the application and tailoring of fourth and fifth amendment pro-
tections to captures at sea). 
233  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272. 
234 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226a(a)(3), 1226a(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
235 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A), 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(4)(A)(i)–
(iii), 1227(a)(4)(B) (2006) (authorizing deportation of aliens for subversive activities). 
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and requires the Attorney General to begin removal proceedings “not 
later than 7 days after the commencement of such detention.”236  If a 
terrorist alien’s removal is “unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable fu-
ture,” he may be detained for additional periods of up to six months 
if his release will “threaten the national security of the United 
States.”237 
Regardless of one’s views on the overall constitutionality (or advis-
ability) of the Patriot Act, it is worth pointing out that many rules of 
criminal procedure are prophylactic rules designed to protect the 
underlying constitutional provision.  They can be adjusted.   
Take, for example, the rules requiring a warrant prior to arrest, or 
a forty-eight-hour probable cause determination subsequent to an ar-
rest without a warrant.  These rules were designed to ensure the full 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.238  In the military, these rules 
are slightly different to reflect military necessities, but they are still 
designed to protect an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.  The 
military has a forty-eight-hour probable cause determination,239 a sev-
enty-two-hour requirement for a command memorandum detailing 
the probable cause for pretrial restraint,240 and the initial review offi-
cer’s (“IRO’s”) independent determination of probable cause.241 
If the rules can be constitutionally adjusted to reflect military ne-
cessities at home, they can be adjusted to reflect military necessities 
on the expanding battlefield.  After all, in addition to rejecting the 
 
236 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(5) (2006). 
237 Id. § 1226a(a)(6). 
238 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“[A] jurisdiction that pro-
vides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general 
matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.”); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 111–19 (1975) (holding as unconstitutional Florida procedures under which persons 
arrested without a warrant could remain in police custody for thirty days or more without 
a judicial determination of probable cause). 
239 Rule for Courts-Martial 305(i)(1), in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 
(2005) [hereinafter R.C.M.]; see also United States v. Rexroat, 38 M.J. 292, 295 (C.M.A. 
1993) (“The purpose of RCM 305 was to comply with Gerstein and Courtney and their 
progeny.”); Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J. 267, 270 (C.M.A. 1976) (holding, in reference to 
Gerstein, that “those procedures required by the Fourth Amendment in the civilian com-
munity must also be required in the military community,” unless military necessity re-
quired a different rule).  The court also held that, since bail does not exist in the military, 
“a neutral and detached magistrate must decide more than the probable cause question.  
A magistrate must decide if a person could be detained and if he should be detained.”  
Courtney, 1 M.J. at 271. 
240 Rule for Courts-Martial 305(h)(2)(A)-(C), in R.C.M., supra note 239.  
241 Rule for Courts-Martial 305(i)(2), in R.C.M., supra note 239.  Note that the IRO does not 
review the commander’s decision for an abuse of discretion; rather, he makes an inde-
pendent decision of probable cause and necessity. 
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proposition that a probable cause hearing is only prompt under Ger-
stein when provided “immediate[ly]” upon completion of the “admin-
istrative steps incident to arrest,”242 McLaughlin allows the Govern-
ment to demonstrate “the existence of a bona fide emergency or 
other extraordinary circumstance” which caused it to hold a probable 
cause determination beyond forty-eight hours.243  The fact that a de-
tention may take place on the high seas, for example, could qualify as 
an “extraordinary circumstance.”  Accordingly, the military has a spe-
cific “at sea” exception to its normal procedural requirements.244 
Most importantly, however, there is a precise constitutional provi-
sion which specifically authorizes the Congress not only to declare 
war, to wage imperfect or limited warfare via letters of marque and 
reprisal,245 but also to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and 
Water.”246 
Fallon and Meltzer are correct that exigencies and practical con-
siderations should afford a more tailored, if not tiered, jurispru-
dence.  Their argument, however, misses the fact that this tailoring 
does not require a shift to a common law-like approach to judging 
because it is already required by the Constitution and such precedent 
as Eisentrager, Milligan (which also confirms the Framers’ original, 
pragmatic intentions), and McLaughlin.  Their argument also misses 
the practical and strategic shift in which battlefield realities now in-
creasingly require greater expansion of rights. 
Matthew Waxman has correctly called for an end to the debate be-
tween “those who say that only traditional habeas corpus rights to a 
fair hearing can sort out these cases and those who say that nonciti-
zen enemy fighters captured abroad in wartime have never been enti-
tled to their day in court.”247  We would “all be better off,” he urges, 
“forging a broad agreement about the minimum acceptable condi-
tions for any long-term detention process, firmly within the rule of 
law.”248  The positive pragmatic principle is the vehicle through which 
we can forge this new agreement, firmly within the rule of law. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Eisentrager, the majority spoke of “inherent distinctions” justify-
ing differential treatment between enemies and non-enemies, aliens 
and residents: 
  Modern American law has come a long way since the time when out-
break of war made every enemy national an outlaw, subject to both pub-
lic and private slaughter, cruelty and plunder.  But even by the most 
magnanimous view, our law does not abolish inherent distinctions rec-
ognized throughout the civilized world between citizens and aliens, nor 
between aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance, nor between resident 
enemy aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident 
enemy aliens who at all times have remained with, and adhered to, en-
emy governments.249 
The question is, why are there these “inherent distinctions”?  Eis-
entrager ultimately answers that question with pragmatics.  Read 
strictly, the enemies in Eisentrager lost habeas rights not because they 
were enemy aliens alone, but also because they lacked “comparable 
claims upon our institutions” and because, as enemies, their access to 
U.S. courts could have proven “helpful to the enemy.”250  The battle-
field pragmatics have changed in the modern era, and thus Eisentrager 
requires a different outcome for today’s detainees than it did for its 
defendants. 
On September 6, 2006, I sat down in Donald Rumsfeld’s office in 
the Pentagon with a senior military officer.  The small table around 
which we sat contained a glass top which protected and displayed 
three pieces of paper.  One of those papers was a satellite image of 
the Korean peninsula at night, with the bottom half aglow and the 
upper half completely in darkness save for a pinprick of light at Py-
ongyang.  Secretary Rumsfeld, I was told, called this image his “socio-
logical experiment,” “proving the value of democracy and free-
dom.”251  But as the Harvard Law School graduation creed reminds, it 
is the law that provides the “wise restraints that make men free.”252 
Law may frustrate at times, but it is ultimately empowering, and 
for the battlefields of the twenty-first century, strategically necessary.  
Fortunately, the Constitution and the Supreme Court accommodate 
the changing realities.  The guiding principles should be that a for-
mal enemy, defined as “a subject of a foreign state at war with the 
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United States,”253 should continue to have minimal due process pro-
tections, but no fewer rights than those commensurate with strategic 
and pragmatic viability.  Enemy combatants may be targeted, indefi-
nitely detained, and subject to military commission, but they must be 
allowed to assert habeas protections under the Constitution when do-
ing so would be not be “impractical or anomalous.”254 
Hostile nonstate actors, on the other hand, are not eligible for 
imprisonment without civilian trial, but the strategic nature of the 
Constitution can allow their targeting, as well as the tailoring of due 
process protections to accommodate the modern battlefield. 
Finally, as necessity creates and limits the restrictive rules, courts 
should review executive claims to it—certainly with judicious defer-
ence, but also with less trepidation and apology.  In all but the legal 
sense of the word, the United States is certainly at war, but prevailing 
in the Fourth Generation conflicts requires greater application of, 
and adherence to, the law.  The Constitution not only continues to 
provide a bulwark for the nation in its struggles, but enables a finely-
tuned arsenal to prevail in them as well. 
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